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INTRODUCTION 
The first  war  that  the 21st CENTURY saw, was between opponents that seemed 
unequal: on the one hand, a super power, armed with the latest technology and aspiring to 
the presidency of the multi-faceted world, and on the other hand, a community banded 
with fanatical attachment to values which, though not shared by the greatest majority of 
its members, are traditional, individual and local, and therefore worth any sacrifice. The 
result of this war is not a foregone conclusion, because often in history there have been 
times that the fanaticism and determination proved to be the most powerful weapons. 
Therefore, to predict anything, we need to understand the nature of this war, try to 
understand why it broke, and which hidden forces drive the enemy army soldiers. 
Without this, we rely only on propaganda on both sides and a flood of patriotic lies, the 
likes of which invariably accompany such struggles. Wars tend to have different levels of 
conflict: economic, religious, ideological, honor, class, and many others. The relatively 
easiest answer is to use an economic explanation, when the war is initiated by the poorer 
against the richer, arguing that the richer had made at the expense of the poorer and 
poorer now takes what he deserves. Such themes can be easily found in today's so-called 
struggle of the so-called free world against terrorism. There are commentators glad to 
explain everything in those terms, claiming again that this ideology of militant Islam and 
human rights is just a cover for a brutal struggle for material success. However, this 
explanation is far too primitive. One has to look further; for example, follow trail 
questions about the ideological basis of this war. Because here we are dealing with 
opposing forces whose conflict has to do with far more than conflicting ideology. 
War is the continuation of other policies, by military means. However, if the 
policy requires the generals and soldiers to obtain what is not in fact obtainable, it is not 
valid.  It should require that which can be obtained. Democracy is friendly to the West 
Middle East and Afghanistan - so it's possible only when conditions are favorable. 
 Every ruler in fact both embodies the power and limits the exercise of power in 
the society and culture which he governs. Government itself, its concept, social 
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understanding and construction (genesis) and the practical operation is the emanation and 
manifestation of the culture of a tribe, group or nation.1 
This paper focuses on the causes of the movements of the Islamic society in 
Afghanistan and also on the objectives and significance of their actions. It will look at the 
role of strategic, cognitive-psychological, and emotional variables affecting individual 
decision-making in the two parties. This raises the question: why did Afghans across clan 
and ethnic divisions look to political Islam as the way to extricate the state from political 
chaos? 
This work consists of V chapters. Introduction explains the framing theory of 
social movements as a structure of Islamic ideology. It defines the basic concepts and 
classifications of social movements in Afghanistan. Chapter I describes the means we 
have to make sense of Islam in terms of politics. Chapter II presents a historical picture of 
the formation of Afghanistan, namely - the XX century-1994 and the Soviet occupation. 
Chapter III presents the rise of the Taliban, their policy, and governments. Chapter IV 
presents the U.S. occupation. Chapter V provides a summary regarding the role of Islam 
in society as well as its influence on the international policy of Afghanistan. 
 
Militant jihad as a global social movement. 
The starting point and basis for the development of the religious teachings of 
Islam which also includes the right-fikh science, is the Koran and sunna. The Islamic law 
is closely related to religion, and the laws of Islam have religious sanction. Islam has a 
much greater extent than other religions regarding it’s a legal character which regulates 
the entire life of a Muslim from the cradle to the grave. God is the source of all law and 
justice powers. The Islamic law covers all the duties of man towards God and men, rules 
of conduct towards their fellow believers primarily, but also against non-Muslim 
communities. Muslim jurists developed a system of Islamic law in the eighth and ninth 
centuries. 
As noted by Marc Sageman, "global jihad (...) is a dynamic social movement that 
creates and breaks the bonds between different terrorist groups”.2  
                                                            
1 Jolanta Sierakowska – Dyndo, Afganistan – w obj?ciach czy szponach tradycji?, Pozna?skie Studia 
?rodkowoazjatyckie, UAM, Pozna? 2008, p. 3-29 
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Global jihad, or the armed movement of radical Muslims for the reconstruction of 
the Caliphate, came to public attention, the media and state authorities, on 11 September 
2001 with the terrorist attack against the WTC and the Pentagon. Although the western 
authorities and the public were genuinely surprised by both the scale and effectiveness of 
the deadly attack, it should be noted that it didn’t come out of thin air. The Leader of Al 
Qaeda openly declared war on America, on 23 August 1996 3, repeating it on a larger 
scale, exactly three and a half years later,4 and the U.S. and other western targets have 
been the epicenter of attacks, in the form of propaganda initially, already much earlier. In 
this article the armed jihad is presented as an example of an interesting contemporary 
global social movement, which can be described and understood using the concept fairly 
well recognized in the sociological literature. The term jihad is therefore reserved to 
describe a social movement, whose ideology is Islamism leadership, and terrorism is but 
one way of combat that this movement uses (in addition to guerrilla warfare and 
propaganda). Because the jihadists don’t possess the means of "classic" War (army, air 
force, navy), they use guerrilla tactics and terrorism - whose effect is multiplied by the 
world's global propaganda media. Mass social movements that use violence, such as jihad 
need to undergo careful observation and careful analysis, as they were, as indicated by 
recent history, the perpetrators of the gravest crimes against humanity - an example might 
be a Bolshevik movement, fascist or Nazi. In each of these cases, both the movement 
itself and its leaders were snubbed in the beginning, and often ridiculed. 
In each case, the ideological bases of these movements openly assumed the need 
to resort to physical violence in the process of elimination of both real and suspected 
enemies - the use of violence was an extremely important element, even necessary to 
achieve the desired social change. In each of these cases, we have the emergence of 
charismatic leaders who initially limit themselves to creating a small organization 
staffing,  to  later  give  rise  to  mass.  In  the  case  of  Bolshevism,  Fascism  and  Nazism,  
violence was used both before and after the conquest of power - but after its acquisition, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
2 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2004 , p.151 
3 Dodatek 1A w: Yonah Alexander, Michael S. Swetnam Siewcy ?mierci: Osama bin Laden i inni szefowie al- Qaidy , 
Bellona, Warszawa 2001, str. 8 
4 Dodatek 1B , w: Yonah Alexander, Michael S. Swetnam Siewcy ?mierci: Osama bin Laden i inni szefowie al- Qaidy , 
Bellona, Warszawa 2001, str. 107 
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it was greatly multiplied, with the acquisition of the state apparatus of repression. In this 
sense, jihad is still waiting for its big break, though it is hard not to notice that there, 
might be examples of it in the case of Sudan after the takeover of power by the Islamists: 
violence is not only limited, but multiplied by the organizational resources provided by 
the state apparatus. Understanding the nature and dynamics of this movement is now in 
general opinion necessary, as it is a constantly growing threat to the social cohesion and 
security of European countries. 
 
Sociology of social movements. 
 As noted by Piotr Sztompka: "(...) social movements (...) share (...) two 
properties. Firstly, they target particular goals to implement some kind of social change. 
Secondly, they do not run in an institutionalized way (or at least they are not fully 
institutionalized and formalized). In this sense, a social movement is something between 
collective behavior (e.g., in the crowd) and professional (e.g. at the office)."5 The 
contemporary jihad fits perfectly in these two differentiators - its ultimate goal is a 
fundamental and profound social change - the perfect reconstruction of a Muslim society 
(which would exist at the time of the birth of their faith) and its "political" 
institutionalization in the form of the revived Caliphate - the Muslim areas, initially, and 
later throughout the world. Its tactical objective is to weaken the Western states as it is 
essential to limit their influence in the Muslim world. Jihadists want to go back to the 
days of the Prophet's humanity and liberate the latter from the oppression of unjust socio-
political systems created by people to give in to the righteous and perfect rule of the one 
true God who has clearly expressed his will in the Koran. The core of society must 
therefore become Koran law, or sharia, which regulates the relationships in all their 
dimensions - in this sense jihad has, like communism, a totalitarian character. The ideas 
underlying the jihad are universal and global – everyone must submit to the will of Allah 
regardless of age, sex, color, belonging to social class, nationality or religion earlier 
(possibility of conversion is perfectly acceptable). The ideology is also deeply anti - 
                                                            
5 Piotr  Sztompka,  Od  dzia??? masowych  do  ruchów  spo?ecznych,  w:  Piotr  Sztompka  „Socjologia.  Analiza  
spo?ecze?stwa”, Znak, Kraków 2002, str. 157 - 158 
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modernist, which opposes the modernization of societies, although it willingly and 
frequently uses the tools provided by modern Western society.  
Moreover, the jihadist movement is, as suggested by Sztompka, by nature not 
fully institutionalized and formalized – it includes registered social organizations such as 
foundations or associations, working side by side with loose associations and networks, 
including the (illegal), terrorist networks. The most important elements of a sociological 
description of this motion will be presented below. 
 
Classification of social movements. 
The design theory of the existence of social movements focuses on the express 
way of communication, namely the transmission of messages by the leaders of the groups 
to a common support. However, the whole concept of ideology focuses on the origin, 
content and method of connection to faith.6 
Jihad is the truest and purest form, to which all Muslims aspire; it is the 
determination  to  do  well,  to  do  justice  -  even  against  their  own  interests.  It  is  an  
individual struggle for personal moral behavior [human]. Especially today, it is a struggle 
carried on many levels: self-purification and awareness, public service and social justice. 
Globally, it is a struggle involving people of every age, skin color and religion, the 
struggle for control of the Great Decisions: not only about who is to exercise authority 
over a particular piece of land, but about more important things - who is to receive 
medicine, or who can eat. 
Taking into consideration sociological criteria, we can say that jihad is a 
movement which is new, radical, value-oriented, reactionary, revolutionary and openly 
referring to violence.7 It is a new movement, because, despite its ideological base - the 
organization dates back to late 20th century, it is not character of class specific, but 
universalist; it refers to people of different social status, material and labor, connected by 
the common interpretation of Islamic religious ideas. Unlike the "old" social movements 
that have corporate or class character, the new are open to a wide recruitment, the 
decentralized organizational structures are loose and they predominate in the form of 
                                                            
6 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Political Islam in Central Asia. The challenge of Hizb ut-Tahir, p.5, 2010 
7Piotr Sztompka, Od dzia??? masowych do ruchów spo?ecznych, w: Piotr Sztompka „Socjologia. Analiza 
spo?ecze?stwa”, Znak, Kraków 2002, str.161 
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volunteer activity. This movement is also radical and focused on values, as intended to 
"(...) change the most fundamental, the basic principles of social order."8 It is also a 
revolutionary movement and openly referring to violence, because its aim is to make 
changes on the road of armed revolution and overthrow the social order in Muslim 
countries replacing them with "new-old", a thing that can be achieved, jihadists assume, 
only with the use of violence. Violence is strongly emphasized in its ideology – hence its 
"terrorist" nature - the killing and intimidation of opponents of the movement, including 
people described as "civilians" is not only permissible, but often even necessary. 
Jihad had over the centuries, two variants of meanings - the first of them more 
radical than the fundamental, the second quite pacific. The first, associated mainly with 
the thinker Ibn Taymiya (1268-1328), holds that born Muslims who fail to meet the 
demands of their religion, may be regarded as infidels and therefore legitimate targets of 
jihad. This interpretation [of jihad] has proved to be needed (as is often the case), when 
one of the rulers of the Muslims declared war against another Muslim rulers, only to 
present the enemy as not properly Muslim therefore dignifying the war as a jihad. 
The second variant, usually associated with Sufis, or Muslim mystics, is the 
doctrine commonly called the "great jihad", but perhaps more usefully termed "higher 
jihad." This Sufi variant invokes allegorical interpretations, which completely change the 
literal meaning of jihad - as an armed struggle. Instead it calls for withdrawal from the 
world, to wage the fight of an individual’s [with himself]'s baser instincts and pursuit of 
higher consciousness and spiritual depth. 9 
 
Frames theory 
Frames theory is often credited with “bringing ideas back in” to the study of 
social movements, but frames are not the only useful ideational concepts.  In particular, 
the older, more politicized concept of ideology needs to be used in its own right and not 
recast as a frame.  Frame theory is rooted in linguistic studies of interaction, and points to 
the way shared assumptions and meanings shape the interpretation of any particular 
event.  Ideology theory is rooted in politics and the study of politics, and points to 
                                                            
8 Ibid, 163-164 
9 Douglas Streusanda. „What is the meaning of jihad?” Middle East Quarterly, 09. 1997  
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coherent systems of ideas which provide theories of society coupled with value 
commitments and normative implications for promoting or resisting social change.  
Ideologies can function as frames, but there is more to ideology than framing. Frame 
theory offers a relatively shallow conception of the transmission of political ideas as 
marketing and resonating, while recognition of the complexity and depth of ideology 
points to the social construction processes of thinking, reasoning, educating, and 
socializing.  Social movements can only be understood by genuinely linking social 
psychological and political sociology concepts and traditions, not by trying to rename one 
group in the language of the other.10 
Frames in Social Movement Research 
The study of social movements has always had one foot in social psychology and 
the other in political sociology, although at times these two sides have seemed to be at 
war with each other. In the 1950s and 1960s, social psychology dominated, and social 
movements were theorized by collective behaviour theorists as long-lasting panics or 
crowds.  In the 1970s, proponents of resource mobilization criticized collective behaviour 
theory, and stressed the importance of political and organizational factors.  In the 1980s, 
social psychologists criticized resource mobilization and political process theories for 
treating social movements only in organizational and political terms, and neglecting the 
problems of social construction.  Snow et al.'s programmatic article on "frame alignment 
processes" was central in the social psychological turn, and is widely credited with 
"bringing ideas back in."11 Framing theory has provided a way to link ideas and social 
construction of ideas with organizational and political process factors. Over a hundred 
different kinds of frames linked with specific movements have been identified.12 
Not surprisingly, frame theory has itself been criticized.  Benford's "insider's 
critique" lists several shortcomings in the way the concept are applied in research studies, 
and assert that the term has become a cliché.13 "Framing" is often inserted uncritically 
                                                            
10 What a Good Idea! Frames and Ideologies in Social Movement Research Pamela E. Oliver 
11 Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. "Frame Alignment 
Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation" American Sociological Review 51(4): 546-481 
12 Benford, Robert. 1997. "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective." Sociological Inquiry 67: 
409-430. 
13 Ibid, p. 419 
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wherever there is a movement-related idea being defined or debated. It has been pointed 
out that the concept of frame does not do justice to the ideational complexity of a social 
movement;14 and that it tends to reduce the richness of culture to recruitment strategies.15 
Steinberg criticizes frame theory as too static and stresses the contextual and recursive 
qualities of frames.16 
Frames and framing processes are powerful concepts.  Frame theory’s emphasis 
on the intentional ways in which movement activists seek to construct their self-
presentations so as to draw support from others points to critical processes in social 
movements.  There is no question that this line of theorizing has been extraordinarily 
productive of new research and new understandings of social movements.  In seeking to 
back up and revisit a particular turn in framing theory, we should not be understood as 
trying to discount the value and importance of a whole line of work.  Nevertheless, the 
power of frame theory is lost if “frame” is made to do the work of other concepts. 
A Frame is a Frame  
The frame concept is rooted in the study of communicative interaction. Gregory 
Bateson introduced the notion of a frame as a metacommunicative device that set 
parameters for "what is going on".17 He showed that interaction always involves 
interpretative frameworks by which participants define how others' actions and words 
should be understood. Twenty years later, frame analysis was introduced to sociological 
research by Erving Goffman. In Frame Analysis,18 and Forms of Talk,19 Goffman 
explored types and levels of framing activities. In Forms of Talk, Goffman discussed the 
several layers of framing in interaction, and shifted his focus to linguistic analysis of 
conversational conventions that mark the application and changes in interpretative 
frames.  Researchers building on Goffman's work have developed an extensive body of 
                                                            
14 Munson, Ziad. 1999. "Ideological Production of the Christian Right:  The Case of the Christian Coalition." 
Unpublished manuscript, Department of Sociology, Harvard University 
15 Jasper, James M. 1997. The Art of Moral Protest. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
16 Steinberg, Marc. 1998. "Tilting the Frame: Considerations of Collective Action Framing from a Discursive Turn." 
Theory and Society  27: 845-872. 
17 Bateson 1972 [1954]. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York: Ballentine. 
18 Goffman, Erving. 1972. Frame Analysis. New York: Harper and Row 
19 Goffman, Erving.1981. Forms of Talk.  Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
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empirical knowledge about how speech occurs, how cultural knowledge is used, and how 
these interplay with interactional intentions and constraints; but this body of knowledge 
has not been utilized by social movement approaches to framing. 
Frames  are  used  to  explain  speech  acts,  rituals,  and  commonly  occurring  
behaviours in other cultures.20 The assumption is that the elements of frames can be 
elicited through ethnographic interview and reconstituted into a working schema or 
algorithm.21 This approach has also been adopted by researchers in artificial intelligence 
to explain speech behaviour in everyday situations such as joking, gossiping, doing 
business, lecturing, shooting the bull, etc.22 
The other way to view a frame is to see it as an inherently malleable and emergent 
mental construct, in Bartlett's terms an "active developing structure"23, shaped in action 
and especially face-to-face interaction as additional elements are added and linked to 
existing structures based on new incoming data. In this sense, frames are the basic tools 
by which "we live by inference," to invoke Goffman's famous dictum.  
It draws four conclusions regarding frame analysis as it is currently practiced by 
social movements’ scholars. First, frames are individual cognitive structures, located 
"within the black box of mental life" that orient and guide interpretation of individual 
experience.  Frames "enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label 
occurrences";24 and "selectively punctuate and encode objects, situations, events, 
experiences and sequences of actions within one's present and past environment".25 They 
are complex interpretative schemata—not just isolated ideas—which are relevant at 
different levels of experience.   Second, frames become important in analyzing collective 
action insofar as they are shared by enough individuals to channel individual behaviours 
into patterned social ones. This presumes an ideal-typical formulation of a frame that 
                                                            
20 Hymes, Dell. 1974. "Social Anthropology, Sociolinguistics, and the Ethnography of Speaking," in Dell Hymes, ed. 
Foundations in Sociolinguistics. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
21 Frake, Charles O.1964. "How to Ask for a Drink in Subanum." American Anthropologist 66: 127-132 
22 Schank, Roger C. and Robert P. Ableson. 1977. Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Deborah. 1993. "What's in a Frame?"  Pp. 14-56 in Framing in Discourse 
23 Bartlett, F.C. 1932. Remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
24 Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. "Frame Alignment 
Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation" American Sociological Review 51(4): 46 
25 Ibid, p.137 
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rises above both idiosyncratic differences between participants and the contention, 
negotiation, and emergence that characterizes discursive behaviour about the frames. This 
aggregated notion freezes the buzzing and swirling confusion of individual cognitive 
processing at a point in time, enabling comparisons at other points of time. Third, this 
snapshot of a frame is a methodological artifice that, in the best of worlds, enables an 
inventory of what cognitive orientations are shared by individual participants. Ideally, 
there would be some representations of the concepts and their interrelations to show how 
thinking within the frame occurs, but with very few exceptions 26 this kind of plotting is 
not found in the social movement literature Fourth, it is important to distinguish between 
these "snapshots," which represent the structure of cognitive frames, and framing 
processes which capture the emergent, contested, and socially constructed quality of 
cognitive frames as they are melded in interaction. Frames are mental structures or 
schemata. Framing is a behaviour by which people make sense of both daily life and the 
grievances that confront them. Frame theory, therefore, embraces both cognitive 
structures whose contents can be elicited, inferred, and plotted in a rough approximation 
of the algorithms by which people come to decisions about how to act and what to say; 
and the interactive processes of talk, persuasion, arguing, contestation, interpersonal 
influence, subtle rhetorical posturing, outright marketing that modify—indeed, 
continually modify—the contents of interpretative frames.27 Applied to social movement 
studies, we can see instances of framing at the SMO level and, if we looked closely, we 
would see them in interaction at the membership level. 
The concept of frame 
The concept of frame points to the cognitive process of mobilizing people’s 
knowledge to interpret events or circumstances, and locate it in a larger system meaning. 
Framing processes are the ways the actors set up one frame or set of meanings, than not 
other when they communicate the message, thereby indicating how the message is to be 
understandable. In the daily contacts, cropping is often done implicitly by the subtle 
                                                            
26 Gerhards, Jurgen and Dieter Rucht. 1992 Mesomobiliztaion: Organizing and Framing in Two Protest Campaigns in 
West Germany. American Journal of Sociology 98: 578-584 
27 Johnston, Hank, and Bert Klandermans, eds. 1995. Social Movements and Culture. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press 
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linguistic and non-linguistic signals. Intentional movements of business activity at the 
organizational level are mainly used to study the social movement framing processes.28 
The concept of the framework draws attention to how the propaganda movement reflects 
both  framework  writers  and  their  perception  within  their  goals.  The  concept  of  the  
framework draws attention to the interactive processes that occur at each level 
movement, both in the organization of traffic and between traffic and outsiders. Solid 
framework concept has the greatest power, when a frame is contrasted with another, 
when the question of how and why a person relies on one frame, and not another, in 
particular, context.  
Frame concepts have made great contributions to our understanding of social 
movements, but sometimes research in a framing perspective would be more illuminating 
if ideology instead of frames were invoked, when the data seem clearly to point to 
ideological issues.  Benford develops the concept of frame disputes, distinguishes types 
of disputes (diagnostic, prognostic, and resonance), seeking to identify the predictors of 
each.29   But the axis along which most of the disputes in his data turned was the ongoing 
battle between moderates, liberals and leftist radicals, and the disputes were more unified 
by their ideological underpinnings in competing social theories than distinguished by 
their emphasis on diagnosis, prognosis, or resonance.  In framing terms, Carroll and 
Ratner's study of the correlation of cross-movement activism with master frames in 
different Vancouver SMOs seems quite different from Benford's.30  Their coding of 
interviewees' views of "injustice and domination" identified three master frames: 
political- economy/injustice, liberal, and identity. Those giving the political-
economy/injustice frame had the most cross-movement activism, while those giving the 
"identity" frame had the least. 
Frame is a useful concept for students of social movements, as are grievance, 
interest, and culture. We are not calling for the abandonment of framing theory, nor 
claiming that framing processes are unimportant. The language of frames is perhaps the 
                                                            
28 Ibid,  
29 Benford, Robert. 1993. "Frame Disputes within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement." Social Forces 71:677-701. 
30 Carroll, William K., and R.S. Ratner. 1996.  "Master Framing and Cross-Movement Networking in Contemporary 
Social Movements."  The Sociological Quarterly 37:601- 625. 
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best way to explain our central point. Frames can be understood as malleable, but this 
version of frame theory focuses on how meanings are negotiated in interpersonal 
contexts. At the same time, there are latent political implications in frame theory, and 
latent social psychological implications in a theory of ideology.  Exclusive emphasis on 
frames can suggest that politics are unimportant, or can be reduced to simple difference 
of opinion. To imply that politics are unimportant and that everybody's ideas are 
structurally equivalent to everyone else's is apolitics.  Frame theory in social movements 
has avoided the danger of complete depoliticization by its intellectual alliance with 
political opportunity theory, and its explicit models of how particular frames appeal to 
particular constituencies, or access particular resources, or take advantage of particular 
political opportunities, although this very turn has led to the most mechanistic and 
superficial images of frame alignment processes. Frame theory has stimulated a wide 
variety of research because it points to important processes in social movements.  
Framing concepts have been enormously valuable and productive, and should not be 
abandoned.   
The Taliban and the Islamic Movements 
Support for the Taliban and social movements stemmed from the rational, 
strategic decision-making processes and culturally-informed emotional responses to 
Islamic frames.31 This paper argues that in this fragmented state, revolutionary Islamic 
movements demonstrated a unique social mobilization capacity based on (a) their ability 
to redefine local and national identities in such a way that overcame pre-existing fault 
lines of conflict, (b) their ability to frame the solution to civil conflict in simple yet highly 
resonant and logically coherent terms, and (c) the legitimacy and motivational power 
offered by charismatic religious leadership.32 These three factors led Afghans to construct 
its own Islam-centered Leviathans. 
Regarding the first factor, in Afghanistan, Islamic movements demonstrated a 
unique ability to create a unified national identity based on religion, which provided an 
alternative to the internal fragmentation of civil war. Central to the message of the 
                                                            
31 Jeff Goodwin, Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements, October 2001 
32Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts (Blackwell Readers in 
Sociology),2009, p.85-89 
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Islamic movements was the argument that other non-Islamic identities, in particular clan 
and ethnic rivalries, were responsible for civil chaos; the solution of an Islamic super-
identity provided a normative framework for a future political order based on an inclusive 
conception of a nation-state.33 
Through their use of Islamic frames, not only did the two movements usher in a 
new Islamic national identity, but they also presented similar diagnostic and prognostic 
framing mechanisms for understanding the civil war stalemates in respective countries; 
they identified the "vice" of warlord corruption as the problem, and identified the "virtue" 
of religious piety as the solution.34 By identifying religious piety as a solution to social 
and political problems, these ideas-by their very definition-demanded collective and 
individual action.  
Finally, the social mobilization success of social movements may be attributed to 
the fact that they were led by charismatic religious figures, whose leadership drew upon 
widely resonant ideas and traditional mores about the Ideal Man. It demonstrated an 
enormous sway in the honor-based cultures of Afghanistan, prompting a culturally-
informed emotional mobilization in support of the Islamic movements' cause 
 
Framing Islam’s Movements 
Benford and Snow define "framing" as the active and dynamic process of 
interpreting and constructing reality, in which movement entrepreneurs are actively 
involved in the production of meaning.35 Movement entrepreneurs make "diagnoses" of 
problems and offer their "prognoses" for correcting them.36 Whether those diagnoses and 
prognoses result in popular mobilization depends on how resonant the diagnostic and 
prognostic framing is, based on the existing cultural, cognitive, and material context. If 
the diagnostic and prognostic frames connect to people's feelings and experiences at 
large, then movement entrepreneurs can prompt people to become involved in the 
movement.37 
                                                            
33 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic activism: a social movement theory approach, 2004, p. 7-12 
34 Benford, R.D. and A. David, Snow. 2000, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. 
Annual Review of Sociology, p.189 
35 Benford and Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movement, p.600 
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The conditions on the ground in Afghanistan in 1994-96 gave credibility and 
legitimacy to the Islamic movements in the country. Almost all Afghans universally 
blamed local warlords and divisive identity politics for their security woes. It gave 
credence to Islamic movements' calls for total social and political reform.  
The Taliban presented a solution to state failure. It proposed a coherent political 
model based on highly resonant and widely held religious ideas. The Islamic message 
acquired its legitimacy. Quite simply, through the statement of a series of religious 
beliefs and through the personification of those ideals in the movement's leadership. 
Stories of heroism and spiritual triumph of Afghan leaders, exemplified the ideals upheld 
by the movements they led.  
In societies that have a strong oral tradition, such popular legends, myths, and 
stories constitute a powerful form of political propaganda; Afghanistan gave social 
legitimacy to the movement objectives and generated support for the Islamic agenda. The 
authenticity of the movement articulators and the narrative fidelity of the stories 
surrounding them mobilized individuals to join the Islamic cause. Emotional and highly 
resonant with traditional religious and cultural mores, these leaders' personal stories 
generated a spirit of revivalism and hope among disempowered Afghan men. The 
framing process is strategic in the sense that the group makes a conscious selection of 
those narratives, rituals and symbols, as well as hadith and Quranic verses that serve its 
aims. In order to make their frames resonate, it must find consistency with deeply held 
cultural values. 
Arguably, these stories constituted charismatic leadership, which had a profound 
mobilization capacity among the target audience. Charismatic leadership changes the 
values, goals, needs, and aspirations of followers, calling them to action "above and 
beyond the call of duty."38 This call to arms is a highly emotional process, wherein the 
follower finds personal meaning and a sense of duty in action, resulting in voluntary 
commitment to the leader and the cause. Charismatic leaders raise individuals to a level 
of self-transcendence, elevating followers' needs from "lower to higher levels of 
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Maslow's hierarchy."39 In the Taliban cases, the personal stories and character attributes 
of the Islamic leader constituted a form of charismatic leadership that generated 
movement mobilization. 
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CHAPTER I 
Defining Islam in Afghanistan 
It is important to illustrate various aspects of Islam in Afghanistan in order to 
provide background for the emergence of Islam. Although the categorization of  
Islamic schools and trends can be unpleasant and often misleading, it is necessary if one 
wants to understand the dynamics that are now playing in Afghanistan. The indications 
that follow are not always represented by different groups or individuals, nor are separate 
to each other, but rather some of the terms may overlap and be together in various 
combinations to describe groups or people. It is only by identifying these categories that 
it becomes possible to determine their impact or interact with the Islamists, who are the 
focus of this paper. It can also be inferred that those who are not part of Islamic 
movement can view Islamist groups with varying degrees of hostility, sympathy, or 
indifference. Moreover, understanding these names is essential to build broader 
categories and trends that can be used today. 
 
1 Popular Islam 
Afghanistan is a country almost entirely composed of Muslims,40 
and Islam permeates Afghan life, providing the basis for a system of standards and 
morals. The term "popular Islam "refers to the way in which religious structures of 
everyday life, live in language, make a meaningful experience and strengthen the cultural 
identity;41 this is not the same as defining the local varieties of Islamic doctrine, but the 
latter can be diluted by pre-Islamic beliefs and sense of duty.42  
In this sense, the category is not defined in contrast to religion, 
understood and practiced by the 'ulama (religious scholars singular:' Ali) or Islamists, 
indicating a high / low division, but rather it is a common denominator for all groups 
of society.43 
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Popular Islam has a universal understanding of Islam as a system that requires 
good, and the belief that obedience provides a sense of specific economic and 
of  social  justice.  Islam  is  also  a  popular  Afghan  'village  Islam  ",  which  is  
presided by a Mulla, a mosque official who has a monopoly on religious 
activity in the countryside, such as circumcision, marriage and burial.44 
  
2 Islam in Tribal Context 
While Islam combines virtually the entire population of Afghanistan, the society 
is divided along ethnic and tribal lines. The largest ethnic group, Pashtuns, is also the 
tribe.Tribes are formulated by a patrilineal origin, and the hypothetical ancestor of all 
Quays is Pashtun, who is said, to descend directly from Islam's Prophet Muhammad. 
Effectively, the Pashtun denied any pre-Islamic past, or the experience of conversion. 
Being Muslim is therefore inextricably linked to their tribal heritage.45 
In this way, what is Islamic and what is tribal overlap. Defense tribal forms,  
for  example,  can  easily  degenerate  into  a  defense  of  the  faith,  as  shown  in  the  first  
Anglo-Afghan war and jihad (struggle) against the Soviets, where tribes fought 
side by side against a non-Muslim entity. However, it is clear that conflicts do not 
exist between tribal codes, for example, and Islamic law. These conflicts are what will 
bring the Mulla in his leadership role. For instance, he uses the "term Book", referring to 
the Koran text, but also to its legal interpretation contained in fiqh (Islamic case law).46 
 
3 Text Islam 'ulama 
In Afghanistan, as well as elsewhere in the Muslim world, ulama operates as a 
Scholastic tradition commentary and ais defined by science, not 
membership in formal institutions. Fiqh Sharia is the body used to introduce 
(Islamic Law) to the public, with a commentary developed over a thousand years by 
trained religious scholars' ulama, who read and interpret the Sharia by a specific set of 
rules. The primary sources of Islam, the Koran and the Sunna, are the bases of practice of 
the normative Prophet, but for "ulama, these texts are not significant, as comments 
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and translators. In this way, textual Islam included "the body of fiqh ulama. In 
Afghanistan, it means Hanafi fiqh, law school, which all of the Afghanistan Sunnis 
follow.47 
"Ulama imagine society governed by the law deriving from the holy text. It is 
important to remember that 'ulama who have knowledge of the sacred text 
and control its interpretation, confirm the legitimacy of de facto political power that 
regulated areas where the text is silent. Historically, the 'ulama who seek to regulate 
Islamic society, the legal system, whose development and interpretation of the law does 
not depend on the state, are essentially concerned with the legal and legislative, and not 
the political. However, as the state takes on more functions previously reserved for 
religious institutions, such as personal status law, the ulama enter the political sphere in 
Afghanistan, as well as in other parts of the Muslim world. It is important to note the 
following mitigation factors that in combination, have disputed this characterization of 
one-dimensional "Ulam: Sufi, the reformist fundamentalism and Islam. These factors will 
be discussed at length below. 
 
4 Sufism 
Sufism is generally understood as a mystical form of Islam that distinguishes 
between exoteric and esoteric revelation. Sufis seek esoteric revelation, the entrance to 
the truth, or haqiqa during spiritual initiation by the spiritual master. Frequently, 
the spiritual master is also called a sheikh or pir and disciple, murid. The student follows 
the spiritual path (Tariq) to discover the intuitive knowledge of the divine. 
Sufis do not define any political agenda. On the contrary, Sufis 
usually avoid worldliness. The anti-materialist attitudes and practices of Sufi meditation 
contract mean that the Sufis can be ascetic and recluse. Many Sufi practices such as total 
submition to a Sufi pir, the remembrance of God (dhikr) in the ritual circle, pantheistic 
forms of sacred worship, are not compatible with orthodox views represented by the 
formal intellectualism 'ulama.48 
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"Ulam historically ranged between resistance and tolerance of these practices of 
piety, and, tolerance. Sufism even extended to include the number of PIR in its ranks. 
Three dominants Sufi Naqshbandi are found in Afghanistan, Qadiri and Cheshti. Pir-'alim 
(master-scholar), a form of Sufi practice does not rival a formal religion, but rather 
provides a more spiritual dimension of 'Ali, who first of all respects sharia. The 
predominant Naqshbandi order is most often associated with the more "orthodox" 
Sufism, but there are also some Cheshti and Qadiri brotherhoods that practice Sufismina 
similar way.49 Maraboutism is a variation of Sufism in Afghanistan, which includes 
collective loyalty to the clan or tribe to the family of saints. The student has a looser 
individual relation to the pir. Hence, it is more superstitious admiration than almost 
master-disciple relationship involved. For example, a student only makes the annual 
pilgrimage to his master. Pir not "Ali is a Marabout and Sufism can be described 
as anticlerical. This type of Sufism is more prominent in the south, and is often associated 
with the Qadiri order.50 
 
5 Fundamentalisms 
The introduction of the term "fundamentalism" is fraught with difficulties. 
However, it is a useful term, if sufficiently explained. Fundamentalism can mean a wide 
range of attitudes. First of all, fundamentalism implies a return to first things.51 The 
Madrasa option requires a return to the study of the Koran and the Sunnah, on the basis of 
Islam, without reference to the four schools of fiqh (Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali, and Shafi'i). 
As a variant of fundamentalism of 'ulama espouses a return to religious law, and, as 
mentioned above, includes the study of fiqh comments, as well as sacred texts. This 
"return" includes both science and implementation of the Sharia. Finally, the variant 
promotes a return to the Islamic practices of the first Muslim community, by promoting 
an Islamic state, through which the Islamists are trying to reconstruct the social and 
political life in the Muslim community of Muhammad. For Islamists, the implementation 
of Sharia alone will not qualify as Islamic. The head of such a state should be a virtuous 
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commander of the faithful (amir al-mu'minin), selected in accordance with the principles 
of Islam, and all institutions should be based on the Quran and Sunnah. 52 
 
6 Shi'ism  
The development of Shi'ism is rooted in the seventh century, when Muslims 
dealt with the question of succession after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. 
A party was created by the cousin and son in law of the Prophet, to promote it as a 
rightful successor of the Prophet, but Abu Bakr emerged as the second leader 
of the Muslim community, despite these claims. Shiites, see "the descendants of Ali 
as rightful leaders (imams) of the Muslim community. Shiites and Sunnis also disagree 
on the religious dimension of leadership. Sunnis claim that the leader of the community 
does not have a divine power, while Shiites believe imams are imbued 
with infallibility, and consider them the blood, by which God gives guidance 
to the community. While the argument about the succession is a historical marker 
division, Shiites then developed their own rich theological and legal literature,  
and are themselves divided into many sectarian divisions. Shiites, who constitute about 
15-20% of Afghanistan, are mainly consisted of the ethnic groups of Hazara and 
Qizilbash. At the level of popular Islam, there are many concepts and rituals common to 
Sunnis and Shiites, as well as at village level, where the differences between Shi'i and 
Sunni Mulla Mulla are difficult to determine.53 Shi'i 'ulama, However, are educated in 
Iran and Iraq (Qom or Najaf) and each one is trained as a mujtahid (A person is qualified 
to interpret Islamic law through ijtihad). While this work focused mostly on Sunni, the 
Shi'i presence in Afghanistan is center to realizing how Shiites have been subjected to a 
process of politicization similar to Sunni Islamists to whom emphasis is placed. 
 
7 Pan-Islam 
The Unity of the entire Muslim community (umma) is for many Muslims, and 
especially for the 'ulama, the eternal fact of non-political realities. 
Political expression of pan-Islamism was a response to colonial expansion in the Muslim 
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countries world made by science and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897). All Afghan; 
devoted his lifetime to traveling and promoting an anti-imperialist, pan-Islamism 
throughout the Muslim the world, representing a unifying ideology that mobilized 
believers to resist the colonial forces. Strength in the West was in direct proportion 
to the collapse of Muslim societies. Rebirth and purification were necessary, and 
a simultaneous need for Shariah returned. Al-Afghani believed that Muslim countries 
should not be introduced to western ethnics, and was opposed to the adoption of 
European courts and legal codes in Muslim countries.54 This solution was resistance to 
foreign interference and he tried to arm the Muslims with the knowledge that their own 
religion was sufficient to treat each new situation. Important to this thinking was the 
concept of a universal caliphate to the implementation of Sharia. For this reason, the pan-
Islamism rejects nationalism, seeing it as divisive. Pan-Islam as a political expression is 
in many ways a precursor of Islamist movements. The primary distinction is that pan-
Islamism is necessarily at odds with nationalism, in which the Islamists operate, though 
sometimes reluctantly.55 
Despite the fact that al-Afghani spent most of his early life in Afghanistan,56 Pan-
Islamism in the strictest sense does not take root in Afghanistan, but rather a pan-Islamic 
sentiment was often manipulated by the rulers in Afghanistan in the sphere of foreign 
policy. In this way, Islam could not only be used to consolidate the nascent state, such as 
a ruler Abdur Rahman used it in the late nineteenth century, but also to support the 
foreign policy initiatives in the name of Muslim solidarity. These initiatives included 
campaigns of conquest and military aid to Muslims in other countries involved in conflict 
with non-Muslims.57 Such a policy is continued in the reign of Abdur Rahman’s 
successor, his son, Habibullah, who was associated with the Afghan reformer Mahmud 
Tarzi (1933). Tarzi became familiar with the pan-Islamic ideas in a short period of exile 
in Damascus; He put forward the most attractive pan-Islamic arguments for 
modernization and against the idea of multiple Islamic caliphates.58 
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Islamism – Political Islam 
As mentioned above, Islamism is a natural consequence of pan-Islamism 
formulated by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who was forced to operate in 
a modern system of nation states. When al-Afghani traveled to Egypt in 1871, he taught 
in al-Azhar University, and his most devoted disciple, Muhammad Abduh, 
al-Afghani put science in the Egyptian context. 'Abduh agreed that reform 
Islam  had  to  be  based  in  the  West,  and  then  entering  the  Egyptian  state  
form of the British colonists. While he asked about the pan-Islamic ideology, its 
mentor, answered, abandoning the language referring to the caliphate. 'Abduh often 
defended the concept Watan (the nation), which was contrary to the ideal Islamic umma 
(Muslim community). 59 Generally speaking, 'Abduh concentrated his efforts more 
locally than al-Afghani. Abduh referred to a movement that al-Afghani advanced as the 
"Salafi." Salaf literally means "ancestors" and generally refers to the first generation 
Companions of the Prophet.60 Salafis argue that the pure Islam of the first days of their 
forefathers was rational, practical and scientific, that is flexible and dynamic. 
According to the Salafis, Islam is inherently flexible, and has been weakened by 
rigid structure imposed on it for the next generation. In promoting a return to the Koran 
and Sunna, Salafism is a fundamentalist reformist movement like Wahhabism and 
Deobandism.  However,  the  emphasis  is  to  reconcile  Islam  and  modernity,  and  
more attention is given to the first community as an object of emulation. Al-Afghani and 
'Abduh are also known as nahda (Renaissance), intellectuals, because they are treated as 
part of the greater Arab renaissance that arose in the second half of the nineteenth century 
(1850-1914) and tried to assimilate Western achievements.61 
The confrontation with the West intensified; the heirs of Salafi movement 
were increasingly concerned about restoring the dignity of Islam, challenged by the 
European hegemony. With the attack of colonialism and the spread of Western culture in 
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traditional Islam, Muslim thinkers realized many cracks in society that were political, 
social, economic and linguistic. 62  
Faced with this religious and intellectual crisis, the Islamic thinkers introduced 
their vision of a modern political movement, and tried to build or change the power 
relations in society. Islamists saw the pervasive role of Islam, which could direct 
society as a whole: religion, politics, law, economics and culture; all these were rooted 
religious terminology, although it was clearly political. Since there is no plan or 
agreement, concerning the principles of Islam as a political system in the sacred texts, 
Islamist  ideas  may  form  the  basis  for  both  conservative  and  liberal  forms  of  
government.63 
In any case, the defining characteristics of Islamism are its political ambitions and 
its objectives of decidedly modern origin.  
In Central Asia, Islam comes in three basic dimensions. First, as an element of 
individual and group identity, the awareness of being a Muslim does not involve the strict 
observance of Sharia and is reflected in the Sufi tradition growing out of the forms of 
popular piety, not underpinned by a sound theological knowledge. Secondly, as a factor 
of national-and country-creation. Thirdly, as the ideological and logistical base to fight 
for a change of the political, social and cultural life.64 
Islam is an important factor in the collective identity and individual societies in 
the region. Muslim elites and structures (especially the descendants of the holy fathers) 
are a highly social authority. This situation is seen by authorities as a threat, and therefore 
limited freedom of action, is used by imams as a tool of social control. But without 
education, Muslim elites cannot confront fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is threatens 
mainly the southern part of Central Asia. The reason lies not in Islam, but the problems of 
social, economic and political nature of the region. Throughout the Muslim world, 
fundamentalism is growing in areas particularly affected by social change such as 
population growth, social stratification, alienation of elites, political infighting, and the 
erosion of traditional social structures associated with migration. Fundamentalist 
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movements  play  a  large  role  in  Central  Asia  and  have  their  facilities  in  the  Fergana  
Valley. 
The Influence of Islam on the reality of the region increases with the tightening of 
the political situation in individual countries and limiting the role of opposition. 
Suppression of the democratic opposition and nationalist movements make Islam with its 
structures and rootedness in the community an attractive alternative to the political and 
social groups rejecting the policy of the authorities. Another factor is the economic and 
social crisis (rising unemployment, population explosion, the crisis of the education 
system), resulting in a widening group of dissatisfied and without prospect individuals, 
usually young people for whom renewal under the banner of Islam brings hope to 
improve the situation. In addition to state failure, burning out propaganda slogans rebuild 
their former glory and act as passwords to discredit democracy and market economy, the 
benefits of which despite declarations - Central Asia societies have not experienced, 
growing popularity of their own way, based on the universalistic teachings of Islam, 
proclaiming equality among other things, for social justice. 
Although Islam is not an economic strategy for the economic crisis, it does 
propose a socio-economic support program for the poor and unemployed. The Islamic 
idea of egalitarianism is an alternative to corruption. Interestingly, the religious factor 
plays a role totally different from that which a few years ago it was designated to play in 
the international debate, mainly by the vision of the coming "clash of civilizations".65 
Conflicts take place within the Muslim community and Islam has never been an official 
cause of conflict. The strength and importance of Islam in the region is determined 
mainly by the function it plays in social life (especially at the level of families and local 
communities), influencing the attitudes and behaviors of individuals and small 
communities. In this way, Islam as a works preservative and stabilizing force. It is close 
to all aspects of social life and plays a major role in regulating the social relationships. 
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CHAPTER II 
Beginnings of Afghanistan 
Afghanistan is a country not of terrorists, nor semi-fanatical, militant Islamists. 
This mosaic of tribes and peoples forms a country of multiple languages and cultures. 
The population of Afghanistan consists, in fact, of some 57 ethnic groups speaking nearly 
50 languages and dialects.66 The Afghans are a proud, hospitable and honorable people.67 
Pashtuns, have for centuries now guarded a code of honor – much like the Japanese 
samurai – to which the elite of Afghanistan still adheres, the Pashtun code. For the 
Pashtuns, death is better than breaking the rules of the tribe, and losing honor. They 
prefer to die than breach the rules and face lifetime banishment, as the latter means exile, 
without the right to return to the circle of their life-giving group or tribe. Exile equals 
darkness, away from the heat and light of warmth and home, where the outlaws will not 
help anyone and everyone can kill them with impunity. The Code requires that the 
Afghans guard the sacred land and home from invasion by strangers guard their women 
from shame and that they learn to respect every person, even a mortal enemy, who 
crosses the threshold of an Afghan home. 
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Ethnolinguistic Groups in Afghanistan.  
Source: The University of Texas at Austin, University of Texas Libraries 
              http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/afghanistan.html 
 
 
Afghanistan has an extremely long and rich history. The first traces of man’s 
presence are about 100-200 thousand years old and date back to Paleolithic times68. 
However, the main topic of this work is the period of modernization and the creation of a 
modern, contemporary Afghanistan. These processes concern the last two hundred years, 
and, it is on this period that this paper concentrates. Extensive historical introduction to 
the topic serves to emphasize the role of Afghanistan in the international arena and to 
stress the fact that one cannot evaluate the internal conflicts in that country neutrally and 
independently of the policies of the great powers, because of their age-old interest in the 
area of Central Asia.  
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Pashtuns have given the modern name of Afghanistan and determined the shape 
of that country. Paradoxically, however, they haven’t played that great a role in its long 
term history. They probably derived from the tribes living in the mountains on the border 
of present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan, which engage in military operations against 
neighboring peoples, or in predatory raids on the inhabitants of the surrounding 
territories. Pashtuns claim to be the best Muslims in the world, derived from one of the 
companions of the Prophet, Abdur Rashid Ghaisa. At the same time, those who do not 
speak the language of Pashtun are not considered to be leading a more enlightened living 
in the remotest mountain villages.69 Pashtuns in Afghanistan's traditional ethnic 
hierarchies are at the top of the social pyramid, are "governing people ', while the lowest 
Hazars  are  Shiite.  The  proper  history  of  Afghanistan  begins  in  the  first  half  of  the  
eighteenth century, when it was united in a Pashtun tribal military confederation under 
the chairmanship of the tribe of Ahmad Shah Durrani, who was obeyed approximately by 
the whole area of present-day Afghanistan and the many territories that are today in Iran, 
post- Soviet Central Asia, Pakistan and India. Then, to determine the short-lived 
kingdoms, the name Afghanistan emerged, namely 'the country of Afghans (Pashtuns)'. 
Ahmad Shah Duran’s state disintegrated and its inhabitants, now beyond the usual attacks 
on neighbors also plunged in a series of wars with them. 
An important moment in the formation of the Afghan state is the end of the 
nineteenth century; the contemporary borders of Afghanistan were the result of the 
colonial policy of the British Empire. The north boundary line was drawn as the 
maximum limit of further expansion of Tsarist Russia by the British. The course of 
setting the southern and eastern boundary was determined by the need to provide security 
for British India. The western boundary line has been designated by the areas in which 
the Shah of Iran could enforce his authority. Within these boundaries stood the country 
whose shape was the result of governments formed by the strong hand of one of the 
descendants of Ahmad Shah Durrani, the King Abdurrahmana (not without reason called 
the "Iron Emir' - 1880-1901) and the British. This great ruler with the help of British 
funding and weapons organized a centralized state on territories conquered by them. 
Afghanistan became a British protectorate this way – a buffer so separate and 
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independent to bar the way for further colonial conquests of Russians in Central Asia and 
isolate itself from the British India, and so archaic, weak, closed and divided so as not to 
disturb the British in achieving the objectives of their regional policy. 
 
 
National borders of Afghanistan.  
Source: The University of Texas at Austin, University of Texas Libraries 
                           http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/afghanistan.html 
 
Soviet occupation 
Under the rule of Abdur Rahman's descendants, the state slowly began to 
modernize. Rapid modernization efforts led to a rebellion against traditional society’s 
'godless' power, but were too slow to catch up with neighbors to try to bring the revolt's 
most progressive and well-educated (though at the same time very few) social strata - 
mostly students and officers. In 1964, King Mohammed Zahir Shah 'gave' the national 
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constitution. In 1973, while traveling through Europe; he was removed from power in a 
coup organized by his cousin70, former Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud. Daud forged 
a friendship with the Soviet Union, which since its inception, led the consistent policy of 
the Afghan staff training (mostly technical and intelligence officers) and the simultaneous 
development of illegal activities of the Communist Party. In 1978, Daud was deposed, 
and took power in the communist elite educated in the USSR. He began the rapid 
modernization of the country in the brutal style of King Abdur Rahman before nearly a 
hundred years. Just like then, modernizers were dependent on military aid and financial 
support by their powerful neighbor. Just like a century ago, the state was led to the rapid 
changes of armed uprisings and revolts throughout Afghanistan. Soviet authorities 
decided to withhold some of the revolutionary ideas of their pupils who had not reckoned 
the possible social and economic costs of reform. In 1979 the Soviet army invaded 
Afghanistan, toppling the previous communist government71. Soviet troops remained in 
Afghanistan until 1989, trying with varying degrees of anti-government forces to destroy 
the guerrillas. It was a difficult task, because they received massive support from abroad, 
from the USA (Americans rightly counted in the Cold War rivalry, the Soviet armed 
forces for Afghanistan to become a new 'Vietnam') and the mainly Muslim countries 
passing through Pakistan, as well as China. The border with Pakistan supplied the 
partisans with weapons and money, as volunteers came from all Muslim countries (but 
mainly Arabs) to fight the godless communist regime persecuting religion.72 Similar 
groups of guerrillas were also those who (though President Ronald Reagan referred to 
them as "fighters for freedom and democracy ") primarily fought to restore religion in its 
rightful place in a society that had already been affected by the reform of individual 
monarchs. 
In 1989, Soviet troops were withdrawn from the country, leaving guerrilla forces 
and government troops fighting each other. The country was terribly devastated, and an 
estimated 9% of the residents were killed73. According to various estimates, between 
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three and five million people fled to Pakistan and Iran (some say 1 / 3 of the entire 
population); and the whole economy was turned onto the tracks of war, including such 
tasks as manufacturing and drug trafficking, smuggling and other74. Ultimately, 
government forces were defeated in 1992, and since then, the Civil War has been fought 
in a different form: 'holy war', by the mujahedin. 
 
The birth and development of the Taliban movement 
To thoroughly understand the motivations of the Taliban one must go back at 
least to the end of the seventies. Then, with the start of fighting in Afghanistan, a wave of 
refugees was launched, most of whom settled in camps in the border region of Pakistan - 
North West Province Frontier. At its peak there were more than three million Pashtuns, 
seeking refuge with their relatives. This rising exodus disrupted all social structures.75 
This was particularly important for the rural population, for which relationships of the 
family, clan and tribe ceased to exist, meaning that refugees were deprived of support 
coming in, living in a bad financial situation in which they felt very lost. Often having no 
job, deprived of purpose in life, these people were fertile ground for groups disseminating 
radical ideologies. The young generation, devoid of tribal traits changed in poor urban 
youth were quite commonly educated in religious schools, the madras, run and conducted 
by the movement deobandii.76  
The Deobandii intellectual trend was formed in the mid-nineteenth century, 
created for the defense of the interests and identity of Indian Muslims. After creating 
Pakistan, it initially dealt with the development of education and maintaining their 
specific religion, in opposition to modernist movements. But gradually, with support 
from tens of thousands of students and graduates of the madras, the ulama became more 
actively engaged in politics, pushing its vision of Islam.77 At the beginning of the1980, 
the movement began to vigorously fight their religious and political opponents with 
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violence. Its alumni opposed the modernist-oriented Sunnis, fighting in Kashmir, and 
above all attacked Pakistani Shiites. This provided them with generous financial support 
from Saudi Arabia, for which this was another front of competition with Shiite Iran for 
primacy in the Islamic world. Guns became very easily accessible, and crime, including 
trafficking in heroin and opium from Afghanistan, flourished78. 
Adherents were students and graduates of madras, mostly Afghan refugees, and 
children coming from social lowlife young Pakistanis. Their education was based on 
deobandii ideology - emphasis on the strict application of sharia law and obedience to the 
fatwa79 ulema. The Madras offered some kind of shelter from the poverty and lack of 
prospects in the refugee camps. They were often the only alternative for orphans and 
refugees arriving from Afghanistan, who, cut off from their ties traditional tribes felt lost 
and lonely. The Madras offered free education, nourishment, shelter, but also the care and 
education without the rest of the cast of teachers.80 The  price  was  the  absolute  
compliance, training in an isolated group of men, based on the Koran and the collection 
of medieval texts, which had to be respected and blindly adhered to.81 This allowed the 
suppression of all manifestations of individualism and transformed passive students into 
fanatics, by touching them not only with the verses of the Koran, but also the cult of 
martyrdom. Their knowing of the land consisted only of war, so they had no alternative, 
they could only be militants from their childhood, joining the jihad. 
The specificity of this version of radical Islam was the symbiosis of science with 
the traditional Afghan code of honor of Pashtuns. It was based on three concepts - 
protection, revenge, and hospitality.82 So great was its importance that the Taliban 
refused to give up Osama bin Laden, who was after the Gulf War in 1991, residing in 
their territory. Around those times the movement gained importance. This happened 
because the previously favored by Saudi Arabia parties lost their privileged position. 
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They stood against Riyadh, because it rejected their proposal to help in the fight against 
Saddam Hussein's regime, and agreed to the stationing of "wicked" troops on Saudi soil. 
In view of these events, the Saudis stopped their assistance. An additional argument for 
this step was previous support of the troops to defeat the forces of Massoud Hekmatyar. 
Saudi Arabia needed a new representative of their interests in the region, clearing the way 
for the development of contacts with the Taliban. Soon after, the deobandii movement 
gained an even more important ally. It was the Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's 
government, which in the name of the fight with his political opponents, decided to 
support deobandii. They even gained the position of the government, which soon enabled 
a significant increase in activity on the Pakistan Afghan arena. 
 
The Taliban and Their Image 
Their ethnicity was one of the reasons for their success, because the traditional 
hierarchy of ethnic Afghanistan, where Pashtuns ruled, was disturbed by both the 
Communists and the mujahideen, often based on population of non Pashtuns. The name, 
under which this movement is commonly known, was first attributed to the group that 
first arrived in Afghanistan. Taliban armed groups were composed entirely of students’ 
madrassas, religious schools teaching the Quran and religious law. In Poland, the word 
talibim distortion (in the singular, the plural tulaba), which in Urdu means the student 
was used to signify the Taliban. The name has played a role in the initial assessment of 
this movement in Afghanistan and around the world. Regarding the image of the Taliban 
in the global media reports of Taliban activities in the Western media, it could still be 
noted up to 1994 that the identification of the Taliban as the students favored the 
adoption of a declaration in good faith with the leaders of the movement pursued by the 
cells. The journalists portrayed the image of the Taliban as they were spontaneous, 
organized on the basis of religious unity movement supporters in Afghanistan, opposing 
the split of the country divided by warring commanders of armed groups, reminiscent 
more of medieval rather than predatory barons of the era mujahideen fighting the Soviet 
army fought. This picture corresponded with the rest of the Taliban hopes in the 
movement of a large part of society in Afghanistan, believing that a Taliban victory 
would put an end to the endless wars conducted by the warring mujahideen commanders 
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who fell victims of the civilian population. The Taliban largely met those expectations, 
hence their high popularity, especially among rural residents, who were the easiest 
victims of looting and rape carried out by the Mujahideen. Another important factor was 
the success of the Taliban rule of admission to its ranks of all those who declared their 
willingness to cooperate with them. The financial and logistical support from the state of 
Pakistan (and especially the intelligence and the army), had great importance as well as 
from various Pakistani parties, foundations and religious organizations, as well as 
influential people, the various lobbies and on the part of ordinary frontier Pashtun Mafia. 
All these forces supported the Taliban as the people promoting the moral, religious 
lifestyle, fighting 'for the faith', as well as carrying out (to some extent) Pakistan's foreign 
policy goals, as well as, simply, because of the possibility of doing business with them. 
The great strength was the religious aura surrounding the Taliban, who entered many 
cities without firing a single shot, bringing peace to a tormented country. A large role in 
their victory was also played by ethnic solidarity, because of their party en masse passed 
other Pashtuns, bribing the enemy, where other measures have not helped. Most of these 
measures failed in the areas of liberal big cities, where religion was no longer such a 
force of attraction, as well as in northern Afghanistan, inhabited mainly by non - Pashtun 
people (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazar, Turkmens, Kazakhs and others.), Some longstanding 
Shiite Islam, different from sunism, and even more from its specific forms, was professed 
by the Taliban. Then the Taliban began to establish their order by using a variety of 
repression of subjects. It is these elements only that are discouraged by the foreign media, 
so far focusing on similar criminal offenses of their opponents. But when the Taliban 
captured Kabul and declared Afghanistan an Islamic state (under the name of Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan, further IEA), and announced the applicable law Sharia, Islamic 
religious law is when the situation really went out of hand. They issued a ban against 
watching television, playing football, chess, and the flying of kites was forbidden by law. 
Homosexuality, pedophilia and sodomy became a crime punished by death. Women are 
forbidden to appear in public without veils and also work in rooms where they may be 
exposed to contact with men who are not members of their families. Girls were banned 
from going to school. All men were required to wear beards. Officials who do not obey 
the order of prayer five times a day were threatened by dismissal. All these measures 
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contributed to the condemnation of the Taliban by the western media and turn to world 
public opinion turning against them. 
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CHAPTER III 
Road to Victory (1994 - 1996)  
The symbol of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan was their leader, Mullah 
Mohammad Omar. Many legends have arisen around his life that does not allow a fully 
credible presentation of his life. Even after learning of Afghanistan by the Taliban he 
avoided meeting with Western journalists and refused to be photographed (like all the 
rest of the Taliban). He was probably born in the first half of the sixties, near the city of 
Kandahar. Educated at the theological seminary, perhaps he was also trained by the CIA 
and the ISI in the refugee camps in Pakistan. During the Soviet invasion, as a mujahedeen 
he fought in the branches and earned well-deserved fame by shooting a grenade launcher. 
He was seriously wounded, by a grenade, which took out his eye. After this he settled in 
the village of Singesar where he led prayers and taught in the rural madras,83 which was 
very much the typical catechetical school of Afghanistan; they fit in the existing mosques 
in every village. People like Mullah Omar taught there - not educated, not having any 
knowledge of theology, and repeating without much understanding the verses of the 
Koran. Most of their adult life was filled with the struggle against the Soviet invaders, 
who  were  seen  not  only  as  a  threat  to  the  state,  but,  above  all,  to  religion.  This  
strengthened the traditional and conservative views, which were then transferred to pupils 
of the madras, the poor country boys who grew up in the spirit of jihad against infidels. 
Just like their Pakistani colleagues, they were suspicious of what is alien, fueled by 
fanatical faith and instilled with obedience. 
According to his associates, Mullah Omar stood out for fanatical religiosity. At 
the same time, paradoxically, lack of education seemed to work in his favor, because it 
allowed him to become a charismatic leader who did not doubt that people could change 
the surrounding reality. His first action that initiated the Taliban movement in 
Afghanistan is also shrouded in a fog of mystery. It is certain that it occurred in the first 
half of 1994. After a two-year struggle for inheritance after President Nad?ibullah, 
Afghanistan bordered on chaos. The country was torn into small pieces ruled by 
mujahedeen commanders, or even common thugs warring among themselves. The main 
forces were fighting for control, which meant that the land around Kandahar had become 
                                                            
83 W. Jagielski, Modlitwa...s.29-33 
38 
 
a land of violence and terror. According to legend, Mullah Omar asked to help the 
villagers, and with a group of 30 students defeated an armed band which terrorized the 
countryside, hanging their leader on the barrel of a tank. Thus began the myth of Omar, 
which is encouraged by the population which treated him as a kind of Robin Hood, who 
fought with local bands, gathering in this way, more, more and better-armed followers.84 
Omar's first confirmed performance dates back to 12 October 1994, when thanks 
to the considerable assembled forces, he took the small town at the Afghan-Pakistan 
border, while intercepting a large part of arms. It also allowed the department to support 
the volunteers with the Pakistani mullah madras. In this way, he stood at the head of a 
large army, which became an important force in southern Afghanistan. Soon there was an 
interesting event, which quite clearly published the policies of Pakistan. 
 November 2nd he was arrested by one of the commanders of the mujahedeen, who 
hoped to obtain ransom. This was one of the reasons which lead a few thousand well-
armed Taliban to attack Kandahar a day later.85 At this point began the victorious march 
of the Taliban, who in less than two years managed to get Kabul and occupy most of the 
territory of Afghanistan. Their successes have several sources. First, as already 
mentioned, the mujahedeen forces were extremely fragmented and slow to cooperate in 
fighting a new enemy. This allowed the Taliban to overcome or absorb small and 
scattered groups of warriors and enabled them to carry out a lightning campaign, which 
in a few months resulted in their getting into Kabul defended by the forces of Massoud. 
Second, the Taliban could count on help from Pakistan. They were supplied with 
weapons, political support, intelligence, and provided with a continuous supply of new 
forces from Pakistani madras. Another important source of money was Saudi Arabia. 
They allowed for the efficient conduct of the fight, and weakened the resistance of 
opponents through bribery of minor commanders. Thirdly, it must be concluded that after 
years of unrest, the emergence of a force which carried with it a sense of order and 
security, assured the support of ordinary Afghans, who are eagerly waiting for peace. 
In spring 1995 the Taliban had suffered the first major defeat when they failed to 
defend themselves against Massoud Kabul. The successes of the Taliban fighters led to 
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an alliance, which in spite of counteracting on the part of Pakistan, was formed in the 
spring of 1996. The Alliance, however, was powerless against Pakistani and Saudi 
intelligence to change the tactics of the Taliban. Instead of attacking Kabul, they began to 
occupy smaller, less-defended cities, cutting off the supply routes of the capital. Against 
the simultaneous attack from three sides, on September 27 1996, Massoud was forced to 
surrender the capital without a fight to withdraw to the safe region Panczszir Valley.86 
Several months before, a decisive Mullah Omar decided to step in to strengthen 
the morale of his warriors and support the struggle by Muslims around the world, using 
the most scared relic of Afghanistan, his cloak, which he believed belonged to the 
original Prophet Mohammed. In this way, ordinary, unlearned rustic mullah became the 
heir of the Prophet, the Caliph of all Muslims. This step provoked considerable outrage in 
the Islamic world. Many scribes protested against the usurper and blasphemer. For this 
reason, he failed to inspire broad support for the Afghan revolution, but Omar's second 
goal was achieved - he had established his leadership of the Afghan Taliban.87 After 
losing Kabul, opposition forces retreated north to the Panczszir Valley and beyond, on 
the border with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Most of the territory of Afghanistan was in the 
hands of the Taliban, who could begin to alter reality in accordance with their faith. At 
the same time north of the country, combat continued with varying intensity, sometimes 
with the Taliban gaining the upper hand, others with the mujahedin gathered in the 
Northern Alliance led by Massoud. Neither side was able to gain advantage over the 
other. The demolition of the unstable equilibrium was brought about before 2001. On 
September 9 an assassination of Massoud was attempted resulting in his death several 
days later. On September 11, bombers sent by Osama bin Laden struck the United States. 
 
The reality in the country of Taliban 
After the capture of Kabul, the Taliban began the transformation of reality, 
striving to implement practices that assimilated of the teachings in madras. The groups of 
deobandii traditionally focused on shaping society and inculcating universal respect for 
religious prohibitions. The state as such, was regarded as impious, which had a very clear 
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impact on the shaping of Afghanistan in 1996 - 2001. By taking power, the Taliban took 
over the ministries, offices and administration, mastering and completely changing them. 
For the deobandii ideology, there was no room for state standing on upholding the 
principles of Islam and the moral can only be subordinated to the religious community. 
Therefore, it provided a semblance of normal functioning of the state, but actually, it 
focused on supervising public morals, trade and war.88 
The functioning of the Afghan population was to be based on a very extreme 
interpretation of Koran law and fatwa, which helped to obey the rules of the Koran. The 
Taliban wanted to create a state modeled on the original community of the first caliphs, 
returning to the old values and views of the world. It was to be a utopia modeled on the 
words of the Koran, which is described in every part of life. It was necessary only to 
adapt reality to the words of the Koran and eliminate what does not occur in them. The 
Taliban wanted to go back and create a world in which there is no room for doubt and 
confusion, and there is a general happiness. As Pashtuns, they had their own code of 
honor to follow, creating a specific hybrid, which is reflected in God's creation of their 
country. Their rigorous vision of social relations was not shocking for the Afghan 
countryside, which cultivated the traditional and conservative views. Especially in the 
south east of the country, inhabited by Pashtuns, the Taliban were welcomed as those 
who bring peace and order. Years of chaos caused people to think that the moral rigors 
were not a high price for security. Otherwise, they were welcomed to the north and west, 
where the Pashtun tribal rules were foreign and the population consisted of other tribes as 
well. One of these was Hazar, who have paid a high price for their otherness and 
disobedience - fanatical Taliban have made several massacres of the population (e.g. in 
Mazar-i-Sharif in August 1998, which almost led to open war with Iran).  
Definitely the worst situation was in the heart of Kabul. For those raised in the 
countryside and in the refugee camps of the Taliban, the city appeared as a habitat of evil 
and corruption that must be converted by introducing Sharia. Therefore, the capital was 
regarded as the main front against the depravity and focused efforts to create a perfect 
society. A special office, the Department of Promotion of Virtue and the Eradication of 
vices was created, its sole purpose being the observance of ascetic morality in a spirit of 
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unquestioning obedience. Subordinate to that were police spies and informers on a 
payroll. Afghans had to pray five times a day, it was mandatory for men to wear turbans 
and chin (like the Prophet), every detail of the clothing was regulated (to the extent of the 
Pakistan football team being beaten for wearing too short pants), television and music 
were banned (TVs triumphantly hung from lampposts), and traditional entertainment of 
any form was canceled. Non-Muslims were repressed, and visits of representatives of 
humanitarian organizations and journalists were restricted. Even the use of paper bags 
was banned, because they can be made from torn sheets from the Koran. 
Regulations deeply interfered in every sphere of life, based on commandments and 
prohibitions. The Taliban wanted every detail to reconstruct the only environment known 
to them – the environment of the raw madras, where they were raised. Infidels were 
forced to respect the rights of the force or risk imprisonment. Anyone breaking the law 
was threatened with the very severe penalties. Every Friday at Kabul stadium spectacles 
of violence were organized in which offenders were cruelly punished for a derogation of 
the rules in force - whipped for drinking alcohol, having limbs cut off for stealing. 
According to the law, punishment enforcement was also exercised by the victims' 
families. 89 
The situation of women under the new rulers of Afghanistan raised particular 
attention in the global community. As the Taliban sought to reproduce the restrictive 
environment of madras, women were a major concern for them, which meant devoting 
them a lot of attention. Tribal law required the separation of boys and girls after the 
completion of seven years.90 Moreover,  the  sight  of  a  woman's  face  outside  the  
immediate family was forbidden. And since the Taliban were brought up outside the 
barrack-like families in the madras, the women were foreign to them. Ignorance induced 
aggression and a sense of danger that contributed to a rationalization of the mistreatment 
of women. Therefore, women had to disappear from the streets, offices, hospitals or 
schools. They found themselves on the margins of society, their lives describing in detail 
the restriction and prohibition orders, which did not leave a bit of freedom and liberty. 
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Afghan women had to wear covering from head to toe, the chador; they could not 
wear tapping walking shoes, and could leave the house only in the presence of the 
relatives. The windows of houses in which a woman lived had to be painted. Women 
were forbidden to work together with men, which in practice resulted in almost complete 
prohibition of work. The most disadvantaged were widows and women whose husbands 
were unable to work.91 Needless to say, they also had restricted access to health services 
and education. The way in which the Taliban treated women, seeking to remove them 
from the political, social and economic development, led to a revival of interest of the 
international community in Afghanistan. Numerous criticisms and condemnation were 
provoked, and public opinion was negatively refocused on the state of the Taliban. But 
the biggest international protests came after the destruction of two giant Buddha statues 
found in Bamiyan found. These were part of the UNESCO World Heritage List. On 
February 26 2001 Mullah Omar issued an edict ordering the destruction of the statues. 
Despite requests and protests from Buddhists from around the world, calls of the Western 
world, China and India, and representatives of Muslim countries, the Taliban were 
intransient. Rejecting the proposed deportation of the unique statues, they blew them into 
the air in March 2001. At the same time, more than 6,000 small statues of Buddha in the 
whole country were also destroyed.92 This barbaric behavior led to the final isolation of 
the Taliban in the international arena. 
The main sources of funds in the country, whose main task was to convert people 
to the only correct way of life for the Prophet and the shaping of reality to the model 
provisions of the Koran was the foreign aid and trade. The money that allowed the state 
to maintain key features of the Taliban and to buy equipment for the troops came from 
Pakistan and, to a certain point, from Saudi Arabia. Only trained professional soldiers of 
the former army of Najibullah, received regular pay, having been recruited by the Taliban 
for the use of tanks, planes or artillery. 
The second source of revenue was trade, which grew by the improvement of the 
conditions resulting from the relative peace in the country, since one order was now in 
power. Trade increased between Central Asia and Pakistan, although it significantly 
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reduced the scale of the lack of good roads. Border trade also flourished. However, the 
Taliban obtained the highest revenue from the smuggling of opium and heroin, going to 
both neighboring countries and to Europe and the United States. Despite the declared 
fight against drugs, poppy cultivation increased significantly. In 1997, Afghanistan 
produced 1 265 tones of opium; two years later, 4 600 tons.93 The temptation to obtain 
significant revenue was stronger than the allegiance to the Koran verses. The long war in 
Afghanistan brought in a fatal economic situation. Areas of agricultural land decreased 
steadily through the destruction of irrigation systems and the disastrous drought (from 
1975 - 1998, farmland acreage has declined from 3 882 thousand to 2 704 thousand 
hectares, according to estimates, and around 12 million Afghans were affected by 
drought)94. Afghan agriculture could not feed the population, which further increased the 
migration to the unprepared neighboring countries. The existing low level of economic 
development required a comprehensive plan, decisive action and significant cash, but the 
Taliban were unable to provide any of these factors. 
 
States supporting the Talibans 
Since the beginning of the emergence of Taliban as a significant force in 
Afghanistan, they received support from Pakistan. It stemmed from political calculation 
on the part of Islamabad, which hoped that the Taliban who ruled the neighboring 
country will be a useful ally, for the improvement of the situation of Pakistan and its 
position  in  the  region  for  multiple  reasons.  First  of  all,  the  Taliban  movement,  as  a  
fanatical warrior’s deobandii, considered Shiite Iran an "unholy" state. Secondly, Russia's 
reluctance to be the heir to the Soviet Union and India’s movement had made them 
enemies. If these countries were to challenge Pakistan, Afghanistan could become a 
significant ally. The Hostility of Iran due to the presence of a large Shiite minority in 
Pakistan, and the rivalry with Russia due to Pakistani plans to gain influence in Central 
Asia further inflamed relations with India over Kashmir dispute. The Taliban were 
strengthened and the situation was bound to end in animosity but for the bargaining 
position of Pakistan. Firstly it could help control the Muslim militants fighting in 
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Kashmir.  Secondly  and  in  every  scratch  –  each  –  other’s  –  back  -  way  Afghanistan  
created an opportunity to stabilize Pakistan's economic expansion in former Soviet 
republics of Central Asia. Good, safe roads and the elimination of countless groups of 
mujahedeen who collected fees for transportation could contribute to increased trade and 
allow Pakistan to import much-needed energy resources from places such as 
Turkmenistan. Thirdly, the calming of the situation in Afghanistan could persuade 
millions of refugees in northern Pakistan to return to their homes. It would tackle the 
problem of humanitarian assistance, lack of control over the region, increasing 
competition and massive smuggling. Religious Taliban could also reduce the flow of 
drugs from Afghan territory. Finally, the Taliban came from the Pashtun tribe, like much 
of the officers of the Pakistani army and ISI intelligence. 
The passage of time has proved that Pakistan's calculations were extremely 
wrong. With their help, the Taliban managed to create a state, but it does not behave as a 
protector for Pakistanis. It resulted in stabilization of the trade routes of smuggling rather 
than a legitimate trade, which was torpedoed by poor quality roads. This activity has 
caused huge financial losses due to unpaid duties and other measures. At the same time it 
did not decrease, but rather increased the flow of drugs, of which some portion remained 
in Pakistan. Most importantly, there was a threat of Islamization of the society, since the 
Taliban began to promote the Pakistani fundamentalists, and thus wished to shed its 
divine revolution to other countries. The changing international situation in the face of 
terrorist attacks was the decisive factor for Pakistan joining the antiterrorist coalition after 
the events of September 11.95 
 
The Role of Pakistan 
In the current situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan becomes an important link in the 
war on terrorism. This is not only due to the fact that its territory is a major organizational 
and training facility for the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other related movements, but 
also because of the role that this country has for logistics operations of international 
forces in Afghanistan .96 
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The political situation in Pakistan has been deteriorating steadily for over two 
years, and most recently in addition to a permanent political crisis increasingly manifest 
itself also through an economic downturn associated with the global slump in financial 
markets. The weak civilian central government in Islamabad is not fully controlling its 
greatest and all-powerful special service (Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI), which is 
suspected of secret support of Pakistani and Afghan Islamic extremists, and is not able to 
suppress the Taliban insurgency. It is not surprising that Islamabad has practically lost 
control over the tribal areas bordering with Afghanistan (North-West Province and the 
federally administered Border Tribal Territories). In areas of both provinces, Islamic 
extremists have formed more than 150 training camps and hundreds of other installations 
and facilities.97 The process of strengthening the extremists in Pakistan has already 
reached the level of threatening the stability of that country.98 
Meanwhile, if the success of the operation in Afghanistan is the key to winning 
the war against Al-Qaeda, provided that the West win the Afghan war the goal is to 
stabilize the political and military situation in Pakistan. Today, because there is no longer 
doubt that the two countries are a kind of "system of connected vessels", which must be 
addressed comprehensively. Pakistan's key role in shaping the geopolitical realities of 
South Asia region was revealed in November 2008, when terrorists from Pakistan 
organization Lashkar e-Taiba (LeT) - very close links with the "old" Al-Qaeda - carried 
out a spectacular series of coordinated terrorist attacks and attacks on a series of targets in 
Mumbai. The place and time to make this operation prove an excellent orientation of 
terrorists in the strategic situation of the whole region and the overall traffic situation in 
the war on jihad with the West. Organizers plan the attacks in Mumbai, assumed to lead 
to a worsening of relations between Pakistan and India (with an open armed conflict and 
earlier), and thus to divert attention from developments in Islamabad on the border with 
Afghanistan and the strengthening of the Taliban movement there. An important element 
of the geopolitical plan was also the complexity of the strategic location of the West 
against the Afghan operation. This is particularly true of U.S. policy, which currently is 
not only forced to act to improve the position of the international forces operating in 
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Afghanistan, but also undertake intensive diplomatic efforts to resolve the India-Pakistan 
conflict.99 
Precision and strategic planners calculating the depth of the attacks in Mumbai are 
attesting to a resurgence of Osama bin Laden organization, a "reactivation" of the 
structure responsible for the attacks on the United States ten years back. It could also be 
taken as a clear sign that the war on Islamic extremism and terrorism does not work on 
Western thought. 
The other country supporting the Taliban regime was Saudi Arabia. Its assistance 
was due primarily to changes in the situation after the Gulf War in 1991, when it 
supported Afghan mujahedeen before (including Hekmatyar) voting on the side of 
Saddam Hussein. Saudi princes decided to support the new force in Afghanistan. In part, 
they counted on their companies' involvement in the construction of pipelines from 
Central Asia to Pakistan. But the main premise was the Taliban's religious convergence 
with the Saudis. Deobandii traffic rules were quite close to the ruling in Saudi Arabia 
rendering a Taliban state the perfect bridge to Central Asia, helpful in spreading the 
Saudi version of Islam. The reversal of the Saudi Arabia towards the Taliban was the 
result of two factors. First, it was associated with Osama bin Laden, who used the 
welcome of Afghanistan. During his activity he became a fierce enemy of the United 
States, which was an ally of Saudi princes, after all. He also turned against Saudi Arabia 
itself, because it allowed the desecration of the holy land by allowing the stationing of 
"infidel" troops. The second reason was the international criticism of the Taliban 
associated with the treatment of women and strict observance of the principles of Sharia. 
Saudis feared that the publicity of this topic will draw the attention of the world to their 
country where the situation does not differ so much from the Afghan realities.100 In view 
of the reversal of its two greatest allies, and isolation by the international community, the 
only support of the Taliban state was Osama bin Laden and the associated network of al-
Qaeda. 
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Afghanistan and Al Qaeda - the road to collapse 
Osama bin Laden was one of the many sons of a Yemeni contractor, who by 
doing work for the Saudi ruling family had earned its trust, and fabulous wealth. He was 
a typical representative of the Arab tribe of the sons of the rich, who quickly made their 
fortunes on petrodollars. He felt lost, torn between an attractive West, which though 
despicable, was alluring and a traditional upbringing that required obedience to parents 
and consent to their chosen path of life. Sent to the best schools in the world, he got a 
taste of freedom, like young Arabs of the West, modernity and moderation. All they 
wanted was to assimilate to Western elites, but they were despised and measured only by 
the state of their account. Knowing the values of the West, they felt contempt for the state 
of order in their homes and were opposed to the prevailing conservatism, and also saw 
the hypocrisy of the oil sheikhs. Overwhelmed with new ideas and willingness to change, 
they wanted to rebel against their fathers, but it would deprive them of wealth. They were 
lost in a world of contradictions, from which there was no way out. In just such a 
situation, a chance that would allow directing their energy presented itself. In 1979, the 
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The young bin Laden, among many like him, went to 
war to find his purpose in life. Many of them came back believing that this is the holy 
war, a fight against the infidels who want to disgrace, humiliate and destroy Islam. First it 
was the Soviet Union; shortly after, this role was taken over by the United States. 
There are conflicting reports on the effectiveness of the young Osama in direct 
combat with Soviet troops, but certainly he was a great organizer and mediator. Taking 
advantage of his enormous wealth he was the attraction, offering accommodation and 
training for Arab volunteers willing to participate in jihad. On the Pakistani-Afghan 
border he created "hostels", training camps for militants, while providing a living for 
them and their families. He also collected donations among the powerful Saudis who 
supported the move, hoping that this way, the radical revolutionaries would stand being 
away from their homes. Around 1988 bin Laden had started to create a database, a kind 
of directory of fighters from around the world, who passed through his camps and were 
ready  to  fight  in  a  holy  war,  wherever  it  appeared.  In  this  way,  to  quote  one  of  the  
theories, the famous Al-Qaeda - "base" was founded. After the Soviet withdrawal bin 
Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. When, shortly after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, he 
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turned to King Fahd to help him by offering their warriors of jihad. He later, however, 
appreciated the seriousness of the threat and did not want to increase the strength of 
fundamentalists, choosing the assistance of the United States. Thus, Osama bin Laden 
joined the opponents of the king, who left their homeland and went into exile in Sudan. 
Thus began his greater career as leader of Islamic fundamentalists, professional jihadists, 
who, often excommunicated in their own countries, were prepared under his leadership to 
fight the infidels. His main objective was to get rid of U.S. troops stationed in Saudi 
Arabia after the war with Iraq, thereby defiling "the earth’s two Holy Places." At the 
same time, he called on all Muslims to abandon the litigation, to unite and overthrow the 
Saud, the coalition partners' cross-Zionist alliance.101 Given the growing number of 
terrorist acts against Americans and their Muslim allies, with which bin Laden began to 
be associated, he was forced to leave Sudan, and in the summer of 1996 he returned to 
Afghanistan. 
The Taliban then found a key moment in the war, wishing to ask a final blow and 
beat the mujahedeen of the country's capital. Osama bin Laden with a group of his well-
trained, ready- for-everything warriors was a great help to them. According to the rules, 
they adopted a Code of Pashtuns in search of refuge, and this in turn reciprocated in 
many ways. First, using his vast wealth, Bin Laden significantly supported the Taliban 
financially, both during the ongoing war, and later, during the construction of the new 
state. Secondly, with his associates - experienced fighters from the period of battles with 
Soviet troops and volunteers, he created a new army to help the Taliban in fighting 
against the mujahedin.102 Thirdly, he promised support in post-war reconstruction of 
Afghanistan, investing in roads, public buildings, promising to build a new capital and 
the largest mosque in the world.103 
Osama bin Laden had a particularly great impact on the person of Mullah Omar, 
unfolding before him a vision of Afghanistan as the first country in which Muslims can 
truly live in accordance with the principles of the Koran. He also, against the advice of 
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some of the Taliban, persuaded Omar to don the mantle of the Prophet and announced 
him the Caliph of all Muslims. Omar conquered people’s minds by presenting himself as 
a leader of world revolution leading to the triumph of Islam. He built Omar a magnificent 
palace, and surrounded him with flatterers. To return the favor, Omar gave bin Laden 
refuge in his country, helping him hide from those who wished him dead. He allowed 
him to create the training camps of volunteers willing to participate in jihad, leaving him 
a free hand in the development of training facilities and the movement of militants. He 
created ideal conditions for the development of Al Qaeda, the international grid 
connections between local organizations and fundamentalists at the ready for jihad 
warriors and planned the next attacks that periodically shook the world public opinion 
and forced governments to pay attention to the importance of the problem. Attacks 
against terrorists linked to Osama bin Laden on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania, made the United States step up the pressure on the Taliban state. Saudi Arabia 
asked Kabul about the issue of bin Laden. The Taliban did not intend to betray their 
donor, but still hoping to pacify international opinion, the Afghan Supreme Court began 
in early November 1998 a hearing related to allegations of Saudi terrorist activities. In 
view of evidence not being presented evidence by the Americans, bin Laden was 
acquitted, and thus rejected the request of Saudi Arabia.104 The refusal resulted in the 
imposition of economic sanctions by the United States, and then by the UN Security 
Council (November 1999). The front of countries interested in the fall of the Taliban 
expanded, joined by Russia, China and India who were concerned about the activities of 
Islamic fundamentalists in their countries. It was also supported by the European Union, 
interested in reducing drug smuggling going on within its territory. 
At that time, Osama bin Laden, because of the intense activities of the 
government of the United States and the world media was promoted to the role of public 
enemy number one, and was held responsible for all the evils associated with Islamic 
fundamentalism. Simultaneously, the Taliban, as those who give him refuge, became co-
responsible for acts of terror. In the eyes of international public opinion Bin Laden, Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban melted into the one body that had to be condemned and combated. 
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The protests broke out in greater force against the Taliban, and especially against their 
way of treating women. Shaped by the media vision, Afghanistan was reduced to the 
image of the great trainer of terrorists training camp in which human rights are violated. 
Therefore, international sanctions were met with approval and the growing number of 
voices calling for action. 
Since people gradually drifted to assist their countries - Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan, the Taliban became completely isolated, thus thrown in even greater 
dependence on Osama bin Laden, his money and weapons. Mullah Omar, overcome by a 
vision of global Islamic revolution, became a kind of hostage to bin Laden. Afghanistan's 
economy was in crisis, further in-depth by international sanctions, and the Taliban needed 
funds to continue the fight against the Northern Alliance to maintain its regime. Saudi 
Arabia was the only one who could deliver them. At the same time international demands 
no longer confined to the issue of bin Laden, but also affected the changes in 
Afghanistan. Against the wall, Mullah Omar chose to follow the rules and did not regard 
Pashtuns his guest enemies. This strategy has not changed even after the September 11 
attacks. When on September 20, President Bush gave an ultimatum to Afghanistan; the 
Taliban rejected it, but at the same time announced that bin Laden had been called on to 
leave their territory. Torn between the fidelity to the Islamic Revolution and the desire to 
save his skin, Omar at this point no longer had any impact on the situation and Bin Laden 
himself. As a result, the coalition attack of 7 October 2001 brought the collapse of their 
regime. 
Al Qaeda is an example of a new type of terrorist structure. This multinational 
network is complex and associated with at least a dozen fundamentalist organizations 
operating independently in different parts of the world.105 What unites them is hatred of 
the West, pro-Western and "secular" governments in the Muslim world and the influence 
of fundamentalist interpretations of Sunni branch of Islam. Individual organizations are 
fragmented and partly "dormant" and conspiratorial. 
                                                            
105 J. Bryla, Near and Middle East in international relations, in: W. Molendowski, International Relations, Wroclaw 
2000, p. 146 
51 
 
Al Qaeda is a self-financing structure not directly supported financially or 
politically controlled by the governments of individual countries.106 Observing the 
development of the Al - Qaeda, professional coordination of its activities, it can be 
concluded that it began to resemble the shape of the agenda for intelligence and 
counterintelligence.107 
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CHAPTER IV  
The war on terrorism.  
George W. Bush, Bill Clinton's successor, had to face the demon, which already 
in the twenty-first century, was reborn with renewed strength. The fight against terrorism 
became one of the most difficult tasks, as it stood before a new American administration, 
as well as the whole world.  
Even before the attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon, proposals had been put 
forward proposals to increase military spending and the strengthening of the U.S. 
presence in the world by tackling totalitarian or authoritarian regimes.108 There was a 
strong reference to "threats from rogue regimes and hostile states, which represent the 
potential for terrorism and development of weapons of mass destruction."109 September 
11 had many consequences. " It destroyed the confidence that America can be not 
attacked, proved that the country is facing the same risks that other countries have to deal 
with every day, showed the danger of actions on their own."110 It graduated from the 
"holiday from history."111 The rhetoric of George W. Bush quickly began to take almost 
religious significance. Convinced of his own mission, the president began to view the 
fight against terrorism as the eternal struggle between good and evil.112 The Congress 
passed a resolution authorizing him to "use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those countries, organizations or persons who, according to his assessment, planned, 
implemented and provided support for the terrorist attacks of September 11, or against 
those who gave shelter to such organizations or persons". Those words meant a lot. The 
U.S. Congress had given consent to the action, but this president and his administration 
had the task of defining the enemy of America.113 Thus, the fight against terrorism 
became a priority. It was treated as a mission articulated in the interests of the entire 
international community, not just for the sake of the USA. 114 
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The attack on Afghanistan began the first phase of the war against global 
terrorism. Americans were feeling the need to do something. They did not want to feel 
helpless anymore.115 According to President Bush, the United States should use its 
power, should "go abroad to destroy monsters." Such thinking lay at the root of the war 
with Afghanistan and propelled the action against rogue states. It was decided to take the 
fight against terrorism in the broadest sense. It was decided to strike hard, using all 
forces. The idea was to show that America is not afraid. On the forum of the United 
States Congress, the president gave a speech. "We demand as U.S. authorities that all al-
Qaeda leaders hiding in the territory of Afghanistan be released. (...) We demand the 
immediate and complete closure of all training bases in Afghanistan, the issuing by the 
appropriate authorities of every terrorist, every person participating in the structures of 
support. (...) There will be no negotiations or talks. The Taliban must respond, and do so 
as soon as possible. They have to give up terrorists, or share their fate. "116 GW Bush said 
in one of his speeches that the Taliban" have to pay a price ", but that does not obey the 
will of the United States.117 We  can  see  so  clearly  that  it  was  not  only  the  terrorists.  
United States wanted to show the whole world that no one can threaten their safety that is 
still hegemonic, in spite of "turbulence" that they have control. 
The United States have shown the world that, thanks to their advanced 
technology, they are able to perform a fast, efficient and victorious military operation in a 
country so remote and "difficult" as Afghanistan.118 The action in Afghanistan, 
codenamed "The ongoing freedom" was considered militarily successful. But it was only 
the tip of the iceberg. "What Afghanistan needs is a kind of Marshall Plan."119 The 
moment of victory proved to the world that the United States is a power that can defeat a 
country about eleven thousand kilometers away. It was a remarkable demonstration of the 
effectiveness of modern technology and the U.S. military. Anything else? Yes, the 
Taliban regime was overthrown, but Osama bin Laden and his tops remained at large for 
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the years to come. The road to a full internal stabilization of Afghanistan was and is still 
very long;120 even with the eventual capturing and killing of Bin Laden. 
The war in Afghanistan gained the support of many countries of Western Europe 
and the Middle East. Nonetheless, it created a dangerous precedent, giving each state the 
right  to  use force in  the face of  terrorist  threats.121 This  international  support  for  action 
taken by the U.S. created the impression that from that moment a truly multi - polar 
world will emerge. It happened; however, the next goal of the "global policeman" has 
become Iraq.122 
 
UN Activities Since 2002 
In the autumn of 2002, the Secretary-General needed to address the international 
community’s growing impatience with deteriorating security, sluggish reconstruction and 
the central government’s difficulty in imposing its authority throughout the country.123 
The community’s fears were gradually confirmed and, unfortunately, obscured some real 
progress that was being made through development programs. Starting in 2005, the 
security situation deteriorated badly. The Secretary-General’s report of September 2006 
said that a third of the country was “racked by violent insurgency.”124 
 
Political Activity 
As noted earlier, the Bonn process in late 2001 called for the establishment of an 
interim administration, the convening of a Loya Jirga, the appointment of a transitional 
authority, the ratification of a new constitution, and the holding of free and representative 
elections. The Loya Jirga, comprising a thousand representatives from 37 regions of the 
country, met from 11 to 19 June 2002 under the protection of the ISAF. A constitution 
was adopted almost unanimously in January 2004 by a 500-member constitutional Loya 
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Jirga. The presidential election was held a few months later than planned, in October 
2004, and President Karzai was elected with 55.4% of the votes. Logistical and security 
problems delayed legislative elections to 18 September 2005. The UN prepared the 
voters’ list and candidates’ registration – a laborious undertaking given the number of 
candidates and the choice of an electoral system that was not fully representative.125 The 
vote count prompted protests, but not of a kind that affected the results.126 The fact that 
elections were held at all constitutes a spectacular success. Alarm was expressed, 
however, in response to the fact that members of the Taliban and people accused of 
crimes against humanity were among those elected to the Legislative Assembly. Many 
instances of corruption, links with illegal armed groups and intimidation have 
undermined the Assembly’s credibility. Over the course of 2007, the UN has become 
increasingly critical of the Karzai government.127 
 
Institution-Building 
The main problem remains the government’s inability to extend its authority to 
the provincial and local levels, which has had the effect of limiting development to Kabul 
and a handful of urban areas. On a more positive note, however, the organization of 
higher levels of the public service now permits budget planning objectives to be met 
independently.128 
 
Humanitarian Relief and Development Assistance 
Since the fall of the Taliban in the autumn of 2001, there has been considerable 
development in Kabul and a few other cities, but “despite these achievements, the 
economic and developmental challenges facing Afghanistan remain daunting.” 
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129Between 2002 and 2005, the international community contributed US$8.4 billion 
toward these efforts. 
The UN has played a key role in bringing emergency aid to the people who 
suffered the most during years of drought and warfare, although security problems make 
distribution very difficult. The establishment of a central administration has enabled the 
UN to withdraw gradually from this sector of activity, but “the capacity of Afghan 
institutions … remains highly dependent on external actors.”130 
Twenty percent of children die before the age of five, life expectancy is 44.5 
years, and a quarter of the population has no access to potable water.131 One of the most 
successful programs has been the poliomyelitis vaccination campaign, carried out 
through UNICEF, which has reached over three million Afghan children. By 2007, polio 
had been virtually eradicated from Afghanistan. Access to health care has been greatly 
improved, and infant mortality can be expected to drop markedly.132 
With regard to education, some seven million children have been attending school 
in 2007, one third of them girls. UNICEF has played a direct role in this success, which is 
all the more remarkable in view of the fact that the insurgents have been targeting 
schoolgirls. 
Two programs launched in the mid-1990s also bore fruit after the fall of the 
Taliban: between 2002 and 2005, some 3.5 million refugees returned to Afghanistan, 
three-quarters of them from Pakistan and most of the others from Iran. A landmine-
clearing program has made it possible for farming to resume on thousands of square 
kilometers of land. 
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A number of other programs of varying size have been launched under the 
coordination of one of the many UN institutions present in Afghanistan: the UNDP and 
the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) are coordinating a program 
designed to create 15,000 jobs, mainly in the construction sector, and the WHO has 
launched programs to distribute vitamin supplements and medicines and to provide 
mental health and family medicine services and anti-tuberculosis interventions. Other 
projects focus on urban development (UN-Habitat), natural resources (through the UN’s 
Food and Agriculture Organization), and culture and the media (UNESCO). 
Before the fall of the Taliban, UN intervention had resulted in the realization that 
success was impossible in the absence of any real desire on the part of either the 
belligerents or the international community to reach a political settlement. At the end of 
2001, the military intervention by the US-led coalition routed out the Taliban and made 
possible the formulation of an ambitious reconstruction plan. The plan’s implementation 
was greatly facilitated by the lessons that the UN had learned from its many previous 
failures. But the enthusiasm that reigned when the Bonn Agreement was signed and 
UNAMA was set up seems to have dissipated, to be replaced by scepticism not only 
about the ability of the international community to act effectively in rebuilding 
Afghanistan but also about the relevance of this role. 
It appears to be more and more difficult for the ISAF to maintain a climate of 
security. The limits of UNAMA’s ability to support the Afghan government in rebuilding 
institutions and infrastructures against a backdrop of acceptable governance seem to have 
been reached, and UNAMA is powerless to coordinate a consistent joint campaign 
against drug trafficking. On the other hand, since the signing of the Bonn Agreement in 
November 2001, the population as a whole has enjoyed a clearly superior quality of life, 
and the number of civilian deaths attributable to conflict has plummeted.133 
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The conclusion to be drawn about UN intervention in Afghanistan depends 
entirely on the point of comparison used: at one extreme, the improbable dream of a 
model state, capable of melding Islamic traditions, modernity and Western ideals, and, at 
the other, the nightmare scenario of a derelict state dragging its people into an endless 
spiral of fratricidal wars. Afghanistan today seems to be suspended between these two 
extremes, caught in an undertow of insurrection, drugs and corruption while it strives to 
grasp an elusive peace. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS  
The war on terrorism has spurred a truly global social movement that has 
embraced an international and compassionate perspective in its advocacy for peace. The 
collective behavior employed by the activists helps, refine understanding of how social 
movements are formed, utilize resources, appeal to the general public, and achieve their 
goals. Independent yet interconnected SMOs have organized to foster a global sense of 
collective identity, framing and attributing their grievances under the rubric of global 
justice and international norms to support local grievances and ferment a sense of mutual 
responsibility. By articulating the broader interconnectedness of issues activists have 
made several governments an arena of struggle over resistance to their support for the 
war on terrorism. Citizens have used their leverage to take advantage of democratic 
spaces to hold governments accountable and to influence their decisions while increasing 
their own public image as a legitimate representation of civil society. They have made 
issues such as equality, dignity, well-being, and human right a central focus of 
contention, thus enabling them to question the legal and/or moral basis for preemptive 
war and to ultimately make substantial inroads into undermining the political institutions 
and infrastructure that support the war on terrorism. The formation of collective identity 
on a global scale has resulted in a common sense of connectedness through the common 
experience of all people affected by violence worldwide. 
This research highlights the importance of the POS theoretical framework in a 
few ways. It demonstrates how social movement actors, by launching a multilateral 
approach in their struggle, have taken advantage of opportunities to voice their 
grievances, taken advantage of public anxieties and dissatisfaction with government 
policies at home and abroad regarding security issues, and have used the clash among 
elites on a domestic and international level to question the accountability of governance 
and state legitimacy. It also illustrates how resource management, organizational 
dynamics, framing, and the use of the "mobilization of shame" in exerting moral pressure 
and persuasion on the opposition are all significant variables in understanding collective 
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behavior. And finally, it adds to our understanding of how the utilization of POS and 
resource mobilization can affect social movement outcomes. Through its organizational 
skills and wide variety of tactics the peace movement has altered public opinion, 
influenced policy makers to change their goals or replaced elected officials that resisted 
their demands, influenced the agenda regarding participation in the coalition of the 
willing, and ultimately altered individual state policies. Though the war on terrorism 
continues, the occupation of Iraq is currently much more difficult to sustain due to the 
growing coalition of the unwilling, and the debate within the United States itself has 
clearly shifted toward a policy of withdrawal. The undermining of the original coalition 
of the willing and the shaming of the U.S. government are certainly factors in the 
anticipated exit from Afghanistan--both consequences of the efforts of the contemporary 
antiwar movement. 
In assessing the five years of Taliban rule, one should take into account both the 
goals that guided their activities and the results that they brought to Afghanistan. Their 
primary task was to seize power over the country and introduce an order similar to the 
words of the Koran interpreted in a literal way not fitting the present. Their goal was 
reached after a two-year military campaign, when the Taliban rule was established by 
taking the capital and spreading to a large part of Afghanistan. Their success was the 
undeniable establishment of order and provision of some sort of stability in a country that 
since the entry of Soviet troops was torn by continual strife. Undoubtedly, they managed 
to stop the various warlords and lawlessness of ordinary criminals who had benefited 
from years of chaos and weak power. Especially the southern Taliban managed to bring 
improvement, which meant that they enjoyed the greatest support. 
Analyzing the results of their operations, however, it becomes apparent that, the 
negative aspects far outweigh the benefits of relative stability. In hindsight, the Taliban’s 
noble and laudable intentions of the introduction of a state of God on earth resulted in the 
imposition of radical demands, responsibilities and patterns of behavior that were not 
accepted by a large proportion of the population, and their enforced observance involved 
applying absolute penalty. New orders hit particularly hard at women in order to strip 
them of all hope of political, social and economic development. Despite the assurance of 
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relative  peace,  the  regime  was  unable  to  improve  the  terrible  state  of  the  Afghan  
economy. Instead, it has greatly increased its reliance on the manufacturing and trade of 
opium and heroin. Religious fanaticism linked to the Taliban and with Osama bin Laden 
led to international isolation of the country and eventually ended in an attack by 
international forces, which are still stationed on Afghan territory. Looking back, one can 
say that the period of Taliban rule was the source of the problems that still remain 
unresolved, providing significant obstacles to the development in Afghanistan. The 
escalation of jihad activities, development of trade routes, weapons and drugs, and the 
increasing of the acreage of poppy and marijuana cultivates are just some of the factors 
destabilizing the situation. And despite the reassurances of representatives of NATO 
forces, one can assume that the Taliban regime might not have said its last word. 
The purpose of the war in Afghanistan was violent, and forced a fundamental and 
complete change of culture of the Islamic society of Afghanistan. The size and scope of 
cultural and civilization changes proposed by the administration of George W. Bush in 
Afghanistan can only give a comparison to the scope and changes in European culture, 
that the Taliban would hypothetically like to seen in the West. The Military draft, forced 
liberalization of Islamic culture is equal of terms of momentum to an Islamization of 
Europe with the introduction of Sharia. Liberalization of Islam, in the new scenario, can 
only be compared with an Islamization of Europe. The purpose of American neo-
conservatives is formally the same as the Afghan Taliban’s. In both scenarios cultural 
fundamentalisms want to redo the whole world on their own, in a manner that resembles 
the treatment of the Indians by the setters after the conquest of America. 
Such an objective is in itself contradictory. It is therefore not possible to carry out 
any liberating crusades solely with military or political means. Because education is what 
ultimately identifies the training, results in a culture of violence. No liberal man Muslim 
or otherwise, resorts in violence. Liberalism imposed by a neo-conservative idea of 
violence is analogous in its logical quality to the Communist "socialist democracy". 
Liberalism militarily imposed upon Islamic countries is a political target internally 
contradictory, and therefore not feasible. Yet for many years, with persistence worthy of 
a better cause, it has been realized. Therefore, the local liberal utopian absurdity becomes 
a global nightmare dystopia. 
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Why the Afghan conflict seems to have no end? The war in Afghanistan aims to 
achieve the objectives because neither the military nor unattainable political means. And 
ISAF or NATO troops in Afghanistan are taking part in a big, poorly designed, and 
internally contradictory social engineering experiment on a global scale (NATO is the 
military and political alliance of global importance). The leaders of NATO seem, 
therefore,  to  come to the aid of  a  NATO member -  like World War I  for  the Axis  –  in  
what one can only hope will not turn out to be a conflict, lasting until the complete 
exhaustion of economic resources, military and political strength. History shows it is not 
advantageous situation. The other side of the coin, doomed to failure, however, is, in a 
sense, winning. Afghan highlanders somehow survived 60 years of war with the British, 
and 20 years of war with the Soviet Union units. Afghans have survived, but the British 
Empire or the Soviet Union did not. Is this to be the fate of the European Union and 
NATO? 
The current course of the war with Islamic extremism and terrorism shows that 
the anti-terrorist coalition to concentrate efforts on the military methods of solution to the 
problem of Islamic radicalism and terror will not lead to success. 
The war with Islamic Jihad should be so treated by the state coalition primarily as 
a struggle for the "hearts and minds" of Muslims. It is clear that any action without the 
psychological dimension and the ideological struggle is not bringing in the long term 
results and effect on the growing reluctance of Muslim societies to the West, which is the 
greatest victory of the Islamists. The strategic, long-term goal of the campaign against 
Islamic fundamentalism must thus seek to persuade the masses of Muslims around the 
world that the West does not lead another crusade, nor fight with Islam as such. 
In the short term, however, it is necessary to prove that Western countries are able 
to exercise political and military for activism in defense of their values and ideals. 
The great difficulty in obtaining success in the war against the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan - and indirectly with Islamic extremism and terrorism in general - 
is born today, through the lack of cohesion and determination of anti-terrorist coalition. 
There is a lack of political will of Western governments and the acquiescence of their 
populations to increase military efforts in Afghanistan and active engagement in 
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combating Muslim fanaticism. There is a growing war-weariness and discouragement 
commonly perceived - especially in Europe - as "not ours". 
What is worse, the current geopolitical situation in the region indicates that there 
is no longer enough military and political victory in Afghanistan. The war front has also 
expanded into Pakistan, where the West's ability to act is limited for now, in fact, to only 
diplomatic means.134 The direction of events in Pakistan will, however, be crucial to the 
success of the mission in Afghanistan and the future of the war with Islamic extremism. 
In the mountains of Afghanistan, there is a clash of two visions of the truth of life; 
one based on full confidence in the world and God, and the other to total lack of trust in 
them. Both appear to the educated observer, equally lame, because both the Islamic 
fanatics showed contempt for the life and faith of Western troops and the Westerners 
exhibited a total disregard for Muslim codes of conduct. As experience shows, they 
concentrate on just one thing: to dominate the every aspect of life, leaving no room for 
even simple tolerance. Ideology is often a substitute for spirituality, because it knows 
how to liberate, but its energy is used for purposes known only to the individual, far from 
the performance of members of the community governed by the ideology. The idea of 
uniting people under indoctrination is, therefore, far from new. 
The ideas driving people today are already familiar and tame. It's just 
totalitarianisms in a new guise. There is no consolation nor hope that this is the last war 
that humanity will engage in; It appears rather as a further step in the process, which lasts 
from the end of World War II, and which is based on the current discharging aggression 
in countless local conflicts that do not save anyone. As a result of these wars, the most 
aggressive individuals of our species simply engage in combat, and the accidental victims 
of the struggle - if they survive - often realize how illusory their views, is driven by a 
massive propaganda, which nurtures in them, the ideology of domination of one 
community over another. How deceptive is that ideology to the collapse of the hopes, 
and, in many cases, lives. And if this senseless war in total becomes on opportunity for 
someone to remember that the spirituality of humanity degenerates rapidly, and that the 
road to peace is lead rather by a spiritual renewal of people, than a technical renewal of 
arms - at least the sense of sacrifice will not have been futile, offering humanity valuable 
                                                            
134 Bill Roggio, „The state of Jihad: 2008”, “The Long War Journal”, 2.01.2009 
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insights into understanding the obvious truths, and - just as it turns out - the most difficult 
ones to assimilate. 
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